Restorative Justice to Supplement Deterrence-Based Punishment: An Empirical Study and Theoretical Reconceptualization of the EPA\u27s Power Plant Enforcement Initiative, 2000-2011 by Rustad, Michael L et al.
Oklahoma Law Review 
Volume 65 Number 3 
2013 
Restorative Justice to Supplement Deterrence-Based Punishment: 
An Empirical Study and Theoretical Reconceptualization of the 
EPA's Power Plant Enforcement Initiative, 2000-2011 
Michael L. Rustad 
Suffolk University Law School, mrustad@acad.suffolk.edu 
Thomas H. Koenig 
t.koenig@northeastern.edu 
Erica R. Ferreira 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael L. Rustad, Thomas H. Koenig & Erica R. Ferreira, Restorative Justice to Supplement Deterrence-
Based Punishment: An Empirical Study and Theoretical Reconceptualization of the EPA's Power Plant 
Enforcement Initiative, 2000-2011, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 427 (2013), 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma 
College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact darinfox@ou.edu. 
 
427 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE TO SUPPLEMENT 
DETERRENCE-BASED PUNISHMENT: AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY AND THEORETICAL 
RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE EPA’S POWER 
PLANT ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVE, 2000-2011* 
MICHAEL L. RUSTAD,** THOMAS H. KOENIG*** & ERICA R. FERREIRA**** 
Abstract 
From the late 1970s to the end of the 1990s, electricity producers 
modified and operated coal-fired power plants in violation of the 
Environment Protection Agency’s (EPA) permitting requirements, creating 
widespread air quality degradation. The EPA’s policy of lax oversight 
ended in 1999 when it launched a large, coordinated enforcement effort. 
The 2012 Republican presidential candidates all denounced this more 
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vigilant EPA as engaging in economic terrorism through “sue and settle” 
tactics that amount to backdoor regulation. This article evaluates federal 
environmental enforcement, drawing upon objective data from our 
empirical study of EPA permitting violation settlements for coal-fired 
power plants entered into between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 
2011. The data reveals that the EPA’s enforcement policy reflects a unique 
jurisprudence that creatively combines both deterrence-based punishment 
through appropriately levied civil penalties and restorative justice principles 
in the form of mitigation projects and mandatory injunctions. Other 
regulatory agencies should consider adopting restorative justice insights in 
designing remedies for diffuse civil wrongs such as securities fraud, 
consumer product safety, and unfair or deceptive trade practices. 
Introduction 
On January 25, 2012, the head of the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
air enforcement division addressed an American Bar Association seminar, 
reaffirming the EPA’s intent to continue to “prioritize the enforcement of 
its new source review permitting program at coal-fired power plants.”1 A 
defense attorney countered that the “EPA has been ‘pushing the envelope’ 
in several recent cases.”2 The attorney’s criticism of the EPA was mild 
compared to that from the candidates for the 2012 Republican nomination 
for president, all of whom called for either the elimination or significant 
downsizing of the EPA.3 The American Coalition for Clean Coal 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Jessica Coomes, Coal-Fired Plant Enforcement Initiative Remains Priority for EPA, 
Official Says, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.bna.com/coalfired-power-plant-
n12884907470/ (reporting on webinar sponsored by the American Bar Association Section 
of Environment, Energy, and Resources). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Bill Straub, Republicans Attack ‘Regulatory Reign of Terror’ by EPA, EVANSVILLE 
COURIER & PRESS (Jan. 15, 2012, 11:59 PM), http://www.courierpress.com/news/2012/jan/ 
15/no-headline---ev_epa/. Republican presidential candidates unanimously called for either 
the abolition or downsizing of the EPA: 
 Republican presidential candidates have viciously attacked the EPA with 
Rep. Ron Paul, R-TX, calling for its elimination. Former House Speaker Newt 
Gingrich promotes an overhaul to essentially disembowel the agency and Texas 
Gov. Rick Perry is promoting changes—prohibiting it from regulating 
greenhouse gases and various other pollutants—that would render the EPA 
toothless. 
 Even former Utah Gov. Jon Huntsman, considered the most moderate 
candidate in the field and the only contender to maintain that human activity 
contributes to global warming, has promised to end the “regulatory reign of 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss3/3
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Electricity,4 an industry lobby, denounces the EPA’s new regulations as 
“the most expensive ever imposed on coal-fueled power plants,” costing 
jobs and significantly raising the price of electricity.5 The EPA is 
increasingly wedged between a rock and a hard place because of the high 
profile struggle between its duty to enforce the Clean Air Act (CAA) and 
pushback from the powerful coal-fired plant industry, with the health of the 
American public being balanced against higher electricity prices. 
This rancorous debate over the EPA’s enforcement policy generates 
more heat than light, featuring such inflammatory phrases from Republican 
leaders as “Obama’s war on coal,”6 “backdoor regulation,”7 and “sue and 
                                                                                                                 
terror” at the EPA.  
 “If you look at the EPA’s record, it is increasingly radical,” Gingrich said 
during a Jan. 8 debate in New Hampshire. “It’s increasingly imperious. It 
doesn’t cooperate, it doesn’t collaborate, and it doesn’t take into account 
economics.” 
Id.; see also Mitt Romney, Cutting Red Tape, WAKEUPAMERICA.COM (Feb. 20, 2012), 
http://news.wakeupamerica.com/Our-Experts/Additional-Contributors/Articles/Cutting-Red-
Tape.aspx (“Bizarrely, in the face of our economic travails, the most active regulator is the 
Environmental Protection Agency . . . . [which] continues to issue endless new regulations 
touching on countless other forms of economic activity—regulations that drive up costs, 
hinder investment, and destroy jobs.”). 
 4. The American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity describes itself as: 
[A] partnership of the industries involved in producing electricity from coal. 
Coal is an abundant and affordable energy resource that has provided nearly 
half of the reliable electricity Americans depend upon each and every day over 
the past decade. ACCCE supports policies that will ensure affordable, reliable, 
domestically produced energy, while supporting the development and 
deployment of advanced technologies to further reduce the environmental 
footprint of [the] coal-fueled electricity generation—including advanced 
technologies to capture and safely store CO2 gases. 
AM. COAL. FOR CLEAN COAL ELEC., http://www.cleancoalusa.org/ (last visited Mar. 24, 
2013). 
 5. President, EPA to Celebrate Job Destroying Regulations, AMERICA’S POWER (Jan. 10, 
2012), http://www.americaspower.org/president-epa-celebrate-job-destroying-regulations. In 
January 2012, the EPA finalized the Utility MACT (Maximum Achievable Control 
Technology) rule for coal-fueled power plants. In response, President and CEO of the 
American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity, Steve Miller, released the following statement: 
“The EPA’s actions are not a cause for a celebration. Their heavy handed and unnecessary 
assault on the American economy only serves to destroy jobs by raising the cost of energy and 
possibly making electricity less reliable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 6. Obama’s War on Coal Claims Another 1,200 More Jobs, GOP.COM (Sept. 18, 2012), 
http://www.gop.com/news/research/obamas-war-on-coal-claims-another-1200-more-jobs/; 
see also Steve Igo, GOP Blames Obama’s ‘War on Coal’ for Alpha Job Cuts, KINGSPORT 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
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settle.”8 This article provides the first systematic empirical data regarding 
the pattern of EPA settlements in its coal-fired plant permitting enforcement 
initiative over the past eleven years in order to replace politicized rhetoric 
with a clear understanding of the enforcement initiative. Part I introduces 
the Clean Air Act’s section 112 New Source Review (NSR) permitting 
program. After years of inaction, the EPA is engaged in a new millennium 
initiative to address CAA permitting non-compliance by coal-fired plant 
owners. Many of the EPA enforcement actions have resulted in settlements, 
which are the focus of our empirical study in Part II. The second part of this 
article presents findings from an original objective analysis that employs 
descriptive statistics and measures of association to examine all EPA final 
settlements with coal-fired plants for permitting violations in decided cases 
from January 1, 2000, to December 31, 2011. 
Part III argues that the EPA’s enforcement strategy employs a unique 
jurisprudence that blends the dual goals of deterrence and restorative 
justice. The polluter is required to pay a penalty for past wrongdoing and to 
make modifications to reduce its hazardous atmospheric emissions while 
simultaneously undertaking remediation projects that aim to restore the 
damaged environment. Restorative justice, applied to civil wrongs, requires 
companies to commit to restoring the environment to its previous state in 
order to repair the community’s injury.9 Our conclusion is that applying 
restorative justice to supplement deterrence-based punishment is an 
unrecognized new enforcement paradigm that should be more widely 
adopted by other regulatory agencies. Restorative projects to mitigate the 
harm are particularly appropriate when redressing community-wide 
                                                                                                                 
TIMES-NEWS (Sept. 18, 2012, 10:00 PM), http://www.timesnews.net/article/9051820/gop-
blames-obamas-war-on-coal-for-alpha-job-cuts. 
 7. See House, Senate Lawmakers Highlight Concerns with EPA “Sue & Settle” Tactic 
for Backdoor Regulation, CANADA FREE PRESS (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.canadafreepress. 
com/index.php/article/44052. 
 8. See id. 
 9. John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or 
Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1743 (1999). 
Restorative justice is a process of bringing together the individuals who have 
been affected by an offense and having them agree on how to repair the harm 
caused by the crime. The purpose is to restore victims, restore offenders, and 
restore communities in a way that all stakeholders can agree is just. 
Id. “Restorative Justice has ancient roots and is described as ‘the dominant model of 
criminal justice throughout most of human history for all the world’s peoples.’” 1 SARAH R. 
COLE, CRAIG A. MCEWEN, NANCY H. ROGERS, JAMES R. COBEN & PETER N. THOMPSON, 
MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE § 15:5 (2011). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss3/3
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probabilistic injuries created by unfair or deceptive trade practices, false 
advertising claims, dangerously defective products, and securities fraud 
with diffuse victims. 
I. Coal-Fired Plant Modifications Without Obtaining Preconstruction 
Permits 
From 1977 to 1999, the EPA did not initiate a single enforcement action, 
even though coal-fired plants often flouted their preconstruction permitting 
obligations.10 This decades-long period of lax enforcement resulted in the 
release of massive amounts of air toxins that continue to harm the public 
health and degrade the air we breathe.11 A recent Abt Associates study 
concluded that fine particle pollution from existing coal-fired plants was 
“expected to cause nearly 13,200 deaths in 2010” and to produce total 
adverse impacts priced at more than $100 billion per year.12 Given the 
gravity of the damage to the environment from not minimizing emissions 
containing hydrogen chlorides,13 dioxins,14 mercury,15 and other highly 
                                                                                                                 
 10. The EPA’s website does not list a single coal-fired plant CAA settlement prior to 
2000. See Coal-Fired Power Plant Enforcement Initiative, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/compli 
ance/resources/cases/civil/caa/coal/index.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). To update 
Roscoe Pound, “The life of the” Clean Air Act “is in its enforcement.” See Roscoe Pound, 
Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 619 (1908). 
 11. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority Clean Air Act Settlement, EPA (Apr. 14, 
2011), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/tvacoal-fired.html (“EPA 
issued [the Tennessee Valley Authority] an administrative compliance order (ACO) alleging 
that TVA modified a number of coal-fired units at nine of TVA’s plants without first 
complying with Clean Air Act (CAA) preconstruction obligations that include obtaining 
preconstruction permits and installing and operating state-of-the-art pollution control 
technology.” (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-92, 7501-15 (2006))). 
 12. Conrad Schneider & Jonathan Banks, The Toll from Coal: An Updated Assessment 
of Death and Disease from America’s Dirtiest Energy Source, CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE, 4 
(Sept. 2010), http://www.catf.us/resources/publications/files/The_Toll_from_Coal.pdf. 
 13. See Letter from Am. Acad. of Pediatrics et al. to Lisa Jackson, EPA Administrator, 
3 (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://www.lungusa.org/get-involved/advocate/advocacy-
documents/epa-mercury-other-health.pdf (“Hydrogen chloride is a strong acid gas that reacts 
with moisture to form hydrochloric acid. Hydrogen chloride intensely irritates the mucous 
membranes of the respiratory system. At high concentrations, hydrogen chloride can cause 
swelling and spasms in the throat and suffocation. In addition, inhaled hydrogen chloride can 
lead to a chemical- or irritant-induced form of asthma called Reactive Airway Dysfunction 
Syndrome (RADS). Both hydrogen chloride and hydrogen fluoride can irritate the eyes, 
nasal passages, and lungs.” (citations omitted)). 
 14. See id. (“Dioxins and furans are a family of toxic chemicals that primarily arise 
from the burning of fossil fuels, such as coal, and exist in the atmosphere both as a gas and 
particles. As particles, they may remain airborne for more than ten days, spreading widely 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
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toxic substances, the failure of deterrence clearly leads to substantial 
societal harm.16 
The EPA has strengthened regulations governing coal-fired plants in 
order to protect the public health from excessive, preventable air toxins.17 
Coal-fired plants plainly externalize health care costs, even when nominally 
complying with federal air permitting requirements. America’s coal-fired 
electricity producing facilities create over “386,000 tons of 84 separate 
hazardous air pollutants from over 440 plants in 46 states” every year.18 The 
specified regulated harmful chemicals, compounds, or groups of 
compounds emitted from power plants, listed in CAA section 112(b), 
include the acid gases: hydrogen chloride (HCl) and hydrogen fluoride 
(HF).19 Hazardous air pollutant (HAP) metals emitted from coal-fired plants 
include arsenic (As), cadmium (Cd) and lead (Pb) compounds.20 Organic 
HAPs include deadly dioxins,21 which are considered highly toxic 
                                                                                                                 
from their source, and depositing in water and soil. Dioxins have been found in the U.S. food 
supply; in 2002-2003, the U.S. Department of Agriculture found dioxin-like substances in 
meat and poultry. Researchers have found dioxins in the breast milk of nursing mothers.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 15. See id. at 5 (“Once released to the atmosphere, mercury returns to the earth in rain 
or snowfall, and pollutes waterways and the wildlife in them[.] . . . Eating foods containing 
methylmercury can expose the brains of adults, children and developing fetus[es] to harm. 
Critical periods are during pregnancy and in the early months after children are born. 
Mercury exposure can lead to developmental birth defects and interfere with neurological 
development. Pregnant women who consume fish and shellfish can transmit that 
methylmercury to their developing fetuses, and infants can ingest methylmercury in breast 
milk.” (citations omitted)). 
 16. See id. (“Non-mercury metals and metal-like substances (e.g. arsenic and selenium) 
comprise a significant part of fine particulate matter (PM2.5) emitted from coal-fired power 
plants. These primary particles come in addition to the secondary particles formed as a result 
of chemical reactions in sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions. Those secondary 
particles, notably sulfates and nitrates, pose similar life-threatening risks.”). 
 17. EPA Issues First National Standards for Mercury Pollution from Power Plants/ 
Historic ‘Mercury and Air Toxics Standards’ Meet 20-Year Old Requirement to Cut 
Dangerous Smokestack Emissions, EPA (Dec. 21, 2011), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/ 
admpress.nsf/d0cf6618525a9efb85257359003fb69d/bd8b3f37edf5716d8525796d005dd086!
opendocument (“EPA estimates that the new safeguards will prevent as many as 11,000 
premature deaths and 4,700 heart attacks a year. The standards will also help America’s 
children grow up healthier—preventing 130,000 cases of childhood asthma symptoms and 
about 6,300 fewer cases of acute bronchitis among children each year.”). 
 18. See Letter from Am. Acad. of Pediatrics et al. to Lisa Jackson, EPA Administrator, 
supra note 13, at 2. 
 19. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (2006). 
 20. See id. 
 21. See id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss3/3
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carcinogens.22 Benzene and methyl hydrazine are also HAPs listed in 
section 112(b).23 Radionuclides emitted by power plants raise the life-time 
probability of serious health issues.24 
Coal-fired “[power] plants are also the most significant industrial 
contributors to the nation’s mercury pollution, which causes serious health 
effects in humans and wildlife.”25 “Mercury is a developmental neurotoxin 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Dioxins and Furans, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, http://www.chem.unep. 
ch/gpa_trial/1_10dio.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2013) (“The overall toxicity of a dioxin 
containing mixture is assumed to be the Toxic Equivalent (TEQ) of a stated amount of pure 
2, 3, 7, 8-tetrachloro-dibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD), the most potent, hazardous and well-studied 
dioxin.”). 
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1). 
 24. DEV., SEC., & COOPERATION POLICY & GLOBAL AFFAIRS NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL 
ET AL., URBANIZATION, ENERGY, AND AIR POLLUTION IN CHINA: THE CHALLENGES AHEAD 
184 (2004); see also Coal-Fired Power Plant Emissions, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/radtown/ 
coal-plant.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013) (“Coal contains trace quantities of the naturally-
occurring radionuclides uranium and thorium, as well as their radioactive decay products, 
and potassium-40. When coal is burned, minerals, including most of the radionuclides, do 
not burn and concentrate in the ash.”); THE BIOSPHERE: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE MIAMI INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE BIOSPHERE 122 (T. Nejat 
Veziroğlu ed., 1984) (symposium held April 23-24, 1984, at Miami Beach, Fla.) (explaining 
overall health risks of radionuclides). 
 25. Nicholas Morales, Case Comment, New Jersey v. Environment Protection Agency, 
33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 263, 264 (2009). 
 Electric utility steam generating units (“EGUs” or “power plants”) fueled by 
coal produce over half of the United States’s [sic] electricity. However, they 
also emit over 150,000 tons of hazardous air pollutants annually, and, in 
contributing over forty percent of U.S. anthropogenic mercury emissions, they 
constitute the single largest source of such emissions. Mercury is an extremely 
dangerous neurotoxin that can cause neurological damage in developing fetuses 
and infants, cardiac abnormalities in children, and cardiovascular problems in 
adults. Mercury emitted into the air as a byproduct of electricity generation 
eventually settles on land and in water, where it bioaccumulates in the fatty 
tissue of fish. Humans and wildlife become exposed to mercury when they 
consume fish in which mercury has accumulated. 
Id. at 264 (footnotes omitted); see also NESCAUM, Mercury MACT Under the Clean Air 
Act: An Assessment of the Mercury Emissions Outcomes of Stakeholder Group 
Recommendations, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON ENV’T & PUB. WORKS (May 8, 2003), http://epw. 
senate.gov/108th/Jeffords_050803_3.htm. 
In 1998, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) identified mercury 
as the hazardous air pollutant of “greatest potential concern” associated with 
coal-fired electricity production. Moreover, coal-fired power plants were 
identified as the largest remaining source of airborne mercury emissions in the 
U.S. following the regulation of other important mercury sources, such as 
municipal and medical waste incinerators, in the late 1990s. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
434 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:427 
 
 
that is” particularly hazardous to developing fetuses and young children.26 
Nitrogen oxides, when combined with volatile organic chemicals, produce 
long-term lung damage, particularly in children.27 Sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxides are converted into fine particulate matter once they become 
airborne.28 These tiny particles are particularly hazardous to children and 
those with respiration problems because they “can be breathed in and 
lodged deep in the lungs, leading to a variety of health problems and even 
premature death,” primarily from lung cancer and cardiac damage.29 The 
harms from this preventable air pollution are widely distributed throughout 
American society. 
In the twenty-first century, the EPA’s enforcement of permitting laws 
has shifted sharply away from neglect and toward proactive vigilance. On 
November 3, 1999, the EPA commenced “one of the largest enforcement 
investigations in EPA history.”30 The EPA’s post-1999 coordinated 
campaign targets utilities that modified their plants “without [incorporating] 
the best available emissions-control technology, [thereby] increasing air 
pollution near the facilities and far downwind of the plants, along the 
Eastern Seaboard.”31 The EPA prosecutors found that “[power] plants 
illegally released massive amounts of air pollutants over a period of several 
years and contributed [to] some of the most severe environmental problems 
facing the United States today.”32 
                                                                                                                 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 26. Keith Harley, Mercurial but Not Swift—U.S. EPA’s Initiative to Regulate Coal 
Plant Mercury Emissions Changes Course Again As It Enters a Third Decade, 86 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 277, 278-79 (2011). 
 27. See EPA, NOx: How Nitrogen Oxides Affect the Way We Live and Breathe, NAT’L 
CTR. FOR HEALTHY HOUS., 3 (Sept. 1998), http://www.nchh.org/Portals/0/contents/EPA_ 
Nitrogen_oxides.pdf. 
 28. See Northern Indiana Public Service Company Clean Air Act Settlement, EPA (Jan. 
13, 2011), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/nipsco.html (“High 
concentrations of SO2 affect breathing and may aggravate existing respiratory and 
cardiovascular disease. Sensitive populations include asthmatics, individuals with bronchitis 
or emphysema, children and the elderly. Sulfur dioxide is also a primary contributor to acid 
deposition, or acid rain.”). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Sues Electric Utilities in Unprecedented 
Action to Enforce the Clean Air Act (Nov. 3, 1999), available at http://www.justice. 
gov/opa/pr/1999/November/524enr.htm (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Coal-Fired Power Plant Enforcement Initiative, supra note 10 (describing 
deleterious public health impact caused by power plant’s failure to meet their New Source 
Review permitting requirements). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss3/3
2013]    RESTORATIVE JUSTICE TO SUPPLEMENT PUNISHMENT 435 
 
 
A. The EPA’s Permitting Requirements for Coal Fired Plants 
1. The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments & Permitting Violations 
The Clean Air Act is considered one of the murkiest federal statutes 
because of its stunning complexity and convoluted history of 
amendments.33 Under the 1970 CAA amendments, Congress added “new 
source performance standards” (NSPS) authorizing the EPA Administrator 
to apply these standards to stationary sources such as coal-fired plants.34 
New sources include any “modification of which is commenced after the 
publication of regulations (or, if earlier, proposed regulations) prescribing a 
standard of performance under this section which will be applicable to such 
source.”35 
The 1974 CAA regulations expressly clarified that existing coal-fired 
plants were subject to EPA regulations if the plants made any major 
modifications to their facilities.36 The CAA created new “requirements for 
preconstruction permits for new and modified major stationary sources,” 
known as the “new source review (NSR) program.”37 The NSR program 
consists of two standards for review: Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD) for regions that have attained air quality standards and 
Non-attainment New Source Review (NNSR) for regions that have not 
attained air quality standards.38 The EPA’s PSD program was 
“implemented through preconstruction reviews of new or modified sources 
of sulfur dioxide and particulate matter.”39 The NSR rules were open to 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 3.1A(A) 
(2012) (“The Act consumes 313 pages in the Statutes at Large, nearly 10 times the length of 
the original Clean Air Act of 1970 . . . .”). See generally The Clean Air Act: What You Need 
to Know, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Apr. 30, 2004), http://www.foley.com/publications/ 
pub_detail.aspx?pubid=2070 (describing the statute’s myriad provisions). 
 34. See 42 U.S.C. § 7211(b)(1)(A), (j)(1)(A)(iv) (1994) (repealed 1996). 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2) (2006). 
 36. The EPA Administrator released final regulations in December 1974 “amending 
each state plan to include a [Prevention of Significant Deterioration] PSD requirement. The 
new PSD program implemented through preconstruction reviews of new or modified sources 
of sulfur dioxide and particulate matter.” Ala. Power v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 347 (D.C. Cir. 
1979) (footnote omitted). 
 37. ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: COMPLIANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT 177 (2001). 
 38. National Enforcement Initiatives for Fiscal Years 2008 - 2010: Clean Air Act: New 
Source Review/Prevention of Significant Deterioration, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/ 
data/planning/priorities/caansrpsd.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
 39. Costle, 636 F.2d at 347 (defining significant deterioration “in terms of allowable 
numerical increases in the concentration of sulfur dioxide and particulate matter in areas 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
436 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:427 
 
 
interpretation as to what constituted a major modification, rather than an 
alteration made as part of a process of routine maintenance.40 The energy 
industry seized upon this definitional indeterminacy as a defense against 
any EPA enforcement action.41 
                                                                                                                 
where ambient pollution levels were presumed by the regulations to be lower than those 
mandated by primary and secondary NAAQS”); see also Third Amended Intervenor 
Complaint ¶ 47, United States v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., No. C2-99-1182 (S.D. Ohio 
filed Sept. 17, 2004) (“Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7409, the Administrator of the [EPA] has 
promulgated regulations establishing primary and secondary national ambient air quality 
standards (‘NAAQS’ or ‘ambient air quality standards’) for certain criteria air pollutants, 
including ozone and SO2. The primary NAAQS are to be adequate to protect the public 
health, and the secondary NAAQS are to be adequate to protect the public welfare, from any 
known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of the air pollutant in the 
ambient air.”). 
 40. JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30853, CLEAN AIR ACT: A 
SUMMARY OF THE ACT AND ITS MAJOR REQUIREMENTS 12, http://www.fpc.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/47810.pdf (last updated May 9, 2005) (“The standards also apply to 
modifications of existing facilities, through a process called New Source Review (NSR). The 
law’s ambiguity regarding what constitutes a modification (subject to NSR) as opposed to 
routine maintenance of a facility has led to litigation, with EPA recently proposing to modify 
its interpretation of the requirements of this section.”). 
 41. Congress compounded the difficulty by creating uncertainty as to the meaning of 
new and modified sources. The D.C. Circuit noted how Congress failed to even refer to 
modifications beyond the NNSR portion of the CAA amendments: 
Due to a technical defect, however, Congress initially achieved this goal only in 
the NNSR portion of the amendments, which defined modification by reference 
to the NSPS definition: “The terms ‘modifications’ and ‘modified’ mean the 
same as the term ‘modification’ as used in section 7411(a)(4) of this title.” By 
contrast, the PSD portion of the amendments applied initially to new sources 
only. Congress corrected this in a technical amendment passed several months 
later, which applied the PSD program to sources that were to undergo 
modifications “as defined in section 7411(a) of this title.” 
New York v. U.S. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citation omitted). The 
CAA amendments’ murkiness reduced the ability of the EPA to enforce the rules. 
EPA’s bargaining power was no doubt substantially reduced by the Agency’s 
determination to eliminate the Clean Air Act New Source Review revisions that 
its own staff was trying to enforce. Industry lawyers correctly calculated that 
the resulting confusion—in the courts, as well as at EPA—opened the door to 
endless litigation that, at worst, would allow their clients to postpone cleanup 
and minimize penalties. Cases that might have settled years ago are still in 
court. For example, the Justice Department announced in December of 2000 
that the Cinergy Corporation had agreed to settle NSR violations, and would 
spend $1.4 billion to clean up its power plants and pay an $8.5 million fine. 
That agreement was shelved in 2001, after EPA announced proposed rule 
changes, and the case has been in litigation for nearly seven years. 
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2. Defining a Major Modification That Triggers a CAA Permitting 
Obligation 
Prior to its twenty-first century enforcement efforts, the EPA was widely 
criticized for overly lax oversight of pollution sources.42 Historically, the 
EPA had a de facto policy of letting “serious violators walk away with the 
equivalent of a slap on the wrist.”43 The EPA’s passivity allowed 
“widespread noncompliance” with permitting requirements, which seem 
less ambiguous than the utilities have claimed.44 A major modification45 is 
                                                                                                                 
Eric V. Schaeffer, Paying Less to Pollute: Environmental Enforcement under the Bush 
Administration, A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY: CLEAN AIR: LAW, POLICY, & PRACTICE 
(Nov. 2007) (footnote omitted). 
 42. See EPA Must Improve Oversight of State Enforcement, EPA (Dec. 9, 2011), 
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2012/20111209-12-P-0113.pdf (“EPA does not consistently 
hold states accountable for meeting enforcement standards, has not set clear and consistent 
national benchmarks, and does not act effectively to curtail weak and inconsistent 
enforcement by states.”). During the formative period of the EPA, the agency was reluctant 
to impose substantial penalties on violators, as in the following example: 
[A] small firm emitting dangerous levels of lead pollution succeeded in evading 
detection for nine years through the simple expedient of failing to apply for an 
emissions permit, and, after its chance detection, continued to pollute under the 
threat of a $25,000 per day fine until reaching a negotiated settlement costing a 
tiny fraction of its maximum possible fine of $25,000,000. 
Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 
YALE L.J. 857, 882-83 n.74 (1984). 
 43. David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a “Reinvented” 
State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1, 3 (2000); see also Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory 
Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental 
Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 879 (1985) (arguing that federal enforcement is feeble). 
 44. Markell, supra note 43, at 56. In 1999, the EPA “dramatically step[ped] up its 
enforcement of new source review, contending that past repairs at many coal-fired power 
plants triggered new source permitting standards.” David B. Spence, Coal-Fired Power in a 
Restructured Electricity Market, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 187, 205 (2005) (explaining 
how the EPA stepped up enforcement against coal-fired plants after a long hiatus of non-
enforcement). 
 The last decade has seen a series of fierce, protracted battles over the 
regulation of air pollution from coal-fired power plants in the United States. 
These battles have been (and are being) waged by electric utilities, 
environmental groups, and the last two presidential administrations, among 
others, before courts, agencies and Congress. 
Id. at 187. 
 45. “New Source Review” covers both new coal-fired plant contraction and 
modifications of “major” sources. The EPA has promulgated regulations to implement the 
NSR program permitting requirements that apply to “major modifications.” 40 C.F.R. §§ 
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the predicate for a NSR permit under the CAA,46 creating the duty to install 
pollution controls that minimize air toxins.47 
The CAA’s 1970 amendments require new or modified (or improved) 
major stationary sources of air pollution to comply with its NSR program.48 
The CAA defines “modification” to mean any change to a stationary source 
that “increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source” or 
leads to the emission of any new pollutant.49 A coal plant is a “stationary 
source” in that it is a “building, structure, facility, or installation which 
emits or may emit any air pollutant.”50 The 1977 amendments drew upon 
this preexisting definition stating, “[A] source undertakes a modification 
when ‘any physical change . . . or change in the method of operation . . . 
which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source’ 
occurs.”51 A “major modification” occurs if a project significantly increases 
total annual emissions at the overall source, calculated using representative 
                                                                                                                 
51.166(i), 52.21(i) (2012). A “major modification” occurs if the project significantly 
increases total annual emissions at the overall source, calculated using representative hours 
of operation. 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(2)-(3), (21). 
 46. New York v. U.S. EPA, 413 F.3d at 10 (“Among other things, these amendments 
directed that major stationary sources undertaking modifications must obtain preconstruction 
permits, as must major new sources, through a process known as ‘New Source Review’ 
(‘NSR’) According to a preexisting definition referenced in the 1977 amendments, a source 
undertakes a modification when ‘any physical change . . . or change in the method of 
operation . . . which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source’ 
occurs” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) (2000)) (alterations in original)); see also United 
States v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d 539, 543 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 47. 40 C.F.R. §§ 7475(a)(1), 7479(2)(c), 7503(a). 
 48. Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, New Source Review: An Analysis of 
the Consistency of Enforcement Actions with the Clean Air Act and Implementing 
Regulations, at i (Jan. 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/ 
civil/caa/doj-nsrreport.pdf. The CAA Amendments of 1970 state: 
The term “major source” means any stationary source or group of stationary 
sources located within a contiguous area and under common control that emits 
or has the potential to emit considering controls, in the aggregate, 10 tons per 
year or more of any hazardous air pollutant or 25 tons per year or more of any 
combination of hazardous air pollutants. The Administrator may establish a 
lesser quantity, or in the case of radionuclides different criteria, for a major 
source than that specified in the previous sentence, on the basis of the potency 
of the air pollutant, persistence, potential for bioaccumulation, other 
characteristics of the air pollutant, or other relevant factors. 
42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1). 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4). 
 50. Id. § 7411(a)(3). 
 51. New York v. U.S. EPA, 413 F.3d at 10 (alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 
7411(a)(4) (2000)). 
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hours of operation.52 New coal-fired plants are not permitted to commence 
construction if their emissions would cause or contribute to air quality 
degradation.53 
The 1977 amendments required PSD review of “19 major sources which 
emit, or have the potential to emit, 100 tons per year or more of any 
pollutant.”54 The PSD also applied to other sources “having the potential to 
emit 250 tons per year or more of any pollutant.”55 The CAA exempted 
extant electricity generating units (EGUs) such as coal-fired plants from its 
permitting requirements.56 
  
                                                                                                                 
 52. 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(2)-(3), (21) (2012) (defining contours of a major 
modification). 
 53. National Enforcement Initiatives for Fiscal Years 2008 - 2010: Clean Air Act: New 
Source Review/Prevention of Significant Deterioration, supra note 38 (“New Source Review 
consists of two programs: prevention of significant deterioration in air quality and non-
attainment with air quality standards (NSR). New and modified sources in areas, where the 
air quality meets existing standards, and in unclassifiable areas, are required to follow PSD 
rules. This means that facilities that emit air pollutants regulated under the Clean Air Act 
must obtain a pre-construction permit, demonstrate that the construction will not increase 
emissions above a certain threshold, and show that facility operations are in continuous 
compliance with the best available control technology (BACT) requirements. In non-
attainment areas, where the air does not meet minimum air quality standards, new and 
modified sources must obtain pre-construction permits, to offset emission increases with 
emission reductions from other sources in the area, and to meet the lowest achievable 
emissions rate (LAER).”). The 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act (CAA) required 
“sources seeking NNSR [Nonattainment New Source Review] permits [to] meet stricter 
requirements than sources seeking PSD [Prevention of Significant Deterioration] permits.” 
New York v. U.S. EPA, 413 F.3d at 13. For example, a stationary source seeking a NNSR 
permit “must achieve the ‘lowest achievable emission rate’ (‘LAER’) for new or modified 
units, whereas sources seeking PSD permits need only use the less demanding ‘best 
available control technology’ (‘BACT’).” Id. “To obtain PSD permits, sources must undergo 
ambient air quality analyses to show that they will neither violate NAAQS increments nor 
adversely affect air quality in national parks or other areas that EPA has designated as 
needing particularly high-quality air.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (2000)). 
 54. Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See New York v. U.S. EPA, 413 F.3d at 13 (observing that Congress compromised 
when making only new or modified facilities subject to the New Source Review permitting 
requirements). Plant operators of older coal-fired plants were thus not required to retrofit 
their EGUs “with additional pollution control technology, such as scrubbers.” United States 
v. Ohio Edison Co., No. 2:99-CV-1181, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25464, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 
22, 2003). 
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B. The CAA Permitting Process 
The states are responsible for implementing the NSR and PSD 
programs.57 The PSD portion of NSR “is a permit program designed to 
minimize emissions from new sources and existing sources making major 
modifications.”58 The 1990 CAA amendments59 required the states “to 
                                                                                                                 
 57. New Source Review Permits, EPA, http://yosemite.epa.gov/R10/Airpage.nsf/web 
page/New+Source+Review+Permits/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2013) (“In many cases the federal 
NSR programs are implemented by delegated or approved State/local/tribal air agencies. The 
Region 10 Office advises and assists states, local governments, and tribes on matters relating 
to the development and implementation of NSR, and takes rulemaking action to approve or 
disapprove state, local, and tribal implementation of the federal programs.”); see also 
Memorandum from Stephen D. Page, Dir., EPA, to Michael Kenyon, Region 1, EPA, et al., 
1, available at http://www.epa.gov/NSR/guidance.html (noting that states implement the 
New Source Review Program). 
 58. Fact Sheet—Proposed Rule: Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V 
Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/NSR/fs20090930action.html (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2013). The NSR permitting program is divided into two programs: one for 
Prevention of Serious Deterioration (PSD) in attainment areas and another for Nonattainment 
New Source Review (NNSR) in nonattainment areas (NAs), applicable to areas that fail to 
meet the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). Justice Souter explained: 
Congress added two air pollution control schemes to the Clean Air Act: New 
Source Performance Standards (NSPS) and Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD), each of them covering modified, as well as new, 
stationary sources of air pollution. The NSPS provisions define the term 
“modification,” while the PSD provisions use that word “as defined in” NSPS. 
Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 565-66 (2007) (citation omitted). The PSD 
requirements apply to areas that comply with NAAQS. In contrast, NNSR applies to 
nonattainment areas. A federal court described these opaque statutory provisions: 
 In 1977, the CAA was amended to include two additional source programs, 
the Prevention of Significant Deterioration [“PSD”] and the Non-Attainment New 
Source Review Requirements [“NNSR”]. PSD applies to all new emissions 
capacity in areas meeting NAAQS and NNSR applies to all new emissions 
capacity in areas not in compliance with NAAQS, i.e., nonattainment areas. The 
PSD and NNSR provisions are collectively referred to as the New Source Review 
[“NSR”] Program. The NSR provisions apply to both new and “modified” 
sources of air pollution. The provisions require “major emitting facilities” to 
obtain permits prior to construction as well as installation of state of the art 
pollution control technology under the direction of the permitting agency. . . . 
 . . . . 
 The definition of “modification” used in the NSPS provisions applies to the 
NSR provisions. 
United States v. Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 829, 849-50 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (alterations 
in original) (citation omitted). In addition, the NSR provisions make exemptions for “routine 
maintenance, repair and replacement” as those terms are used in the NSPS provisions. Id. at 
850 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(2)(iii)(a) (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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administer a comprehensive permit program for the operation of sources 
emitting air pollutants.”60 States exempt existing power plants but utilities 
are subject to state permitting when they refurbish or modify their 
electricity generating units.61 
New power plants must implement “MACT [maximum achievable 
control technology]—and not BACT [best available control technology]— 
. . . to a coal-fired plant’s emissions of hazardous pollutants like 
mercury.”62 A major stationary source, for example, must install the BACT 
for an attainment pollutant or achieve the Lowest Achievable Emission 
Rate (LAER) in a nonattainment area.63 The EPA describes preconstruction 
                                                                                                                 
 59. The amendments are as follows: 
The principal changes to the Clean Air Act wrought by the Congress in 1990 
address the subjects of nonattainment (tit. I, 72 pages), mobile sources (tit. II, 
60 pages), hazardous air pollutants (tit. III, 53 pages), acid deposition control 
(tit. IV, 50 pages), permits (tit. V, 13 pages), stratospheric ozone protection (tit. 
VI, 24 pages), and enforcement (tit. VII, 13 pages). 
1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AIR AND WATER § 3:1B (Supp. 2012). 
 60. MCCARTHY, supra note 40, at 15. 
 61. See Karl A. Karg, EPA is Taking a More Aggressive Role in Clean Air Act 
Enforcement Against Owners of Coal-Fired Generating Units, Including the Targeting of 
Municipalities for “Informal” Enforcement Negotiations, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, 1 (Dec. 
8, 2010), http://www.lw.com (search for “Client Alert 1108”; then follow “EPA is Taking a 
More Aggressive Role in Clean Air Act Enforcement” hyperlink) (“Many coal-fired 
facilities in the Eastern half of the country contain ‘vintage’ coal-fired units dating back to 
the 1950’s or 1960’s, and these units were essentially grandfathered into the Clean Air Act’s 
permitting scheme under the PSD/NSR provisions. The theory behind the grandfathering 
scheme is that at some date certain, these older units will reach the end of their useful lives 
and not be functional unless they undergo ‘major modifications.’ Once this point is reached 
and a ‘major modification’ occurs, PSD/NSR review is triggered and the older unit is subject 
to BACT. If, however, the unit is merely maintained in a ‘routine’ manner (routine 
maintenance, repair and replacement (RMRR)), PSD/NSR review is not triggered.”); 
Spence, supra note 44, at 195 (stating that plants grandfathered by the CAA regulations, 
“many of them in the Midwest, continued to pollute at essentially unregulated rates long 
after the passage of the Act, depositing acid rain and other pollution on downwind states”). 
 62. Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P., 627 F.3d 134, 140 n.8 (5th 
Cir. 2010); see, e.g., Christina C. Caplan, Comment, The Failure of Current Legal and 
Regulatory Mechanisms to Control Interstate Ozone Transport: The Need for National 
Legislation, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 169, 186 (2001) (“The complaints allege that the companies 
made major modifications at their plants that triggered NSR permitting requirements, but 
that the companies failed to apply for the necessary permits and to install ‘best available 
control technology’ (BACT) as required under the NSR program.”). 
 63. The EPA describes: 
New Source Review [as consisting] of two programs: prevention of significant 
deterioration in air quality and non-attainment with air quality standards (NSR). 
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permits as regulating “air emissions control requirements that apply to a 
facility, such as national emissions standards for hazardous air pollutants, 
new source performance standards, or best available control technologies 
required by a PSD permit.”64 A coal-fired plant modifying its EGU must 
fulfill eight steps: 
(1) a permit setting forth emission limitations must be issued; (2) 
the proposed permit [must be] analyzed and a public hearing . . . 
held; (3) the owner must demonstrate that emissions will not 
increase emissions (using several parameters); (4) [the owner 
must] ensure that the proposed facility is subject to the best 
available control technology (“BACT”) for pollutants; (5) [the 
owner must] comply with those BACT provisions; (6) [the 
owner must] study projected impacts that may result from the 
growth of the facility; (7) the owner/operator must agree to 
monitor to determine the effect of emissions from the facility; 
and (8) [the owner must attain] certain approval that is not 
relevant to this case.65 
                                                                                                                 
New and modified sources in areas, where the air quality meets existing 
standards, and in unclassifiable areas, are required to follow PSD rules. This 
means that facilities that emit air pollutants regulated under the Clean Air Act 
must obtain a pre-construction permit, demonstrate that the construction will 
not increase emissions above a certain threshold, and show that facility 
operations are in continuous compliance with the best available control 
technology (BACT) requirements. In non-attainment areas, where the air does 
not meet minimum air quality standards, new and modified sources must obtain 
pre-construction permits, to offset emission increases with emission reductions 
from other sources in the area, and to meet the lowest achievable emissions rate 
(LAER). 
National Enforcement Initiatives for Fiscal Years 2008 - 2010: Clean Air Act: New Source 
Review/Prevention of Significant Deterioration, supra note 38. The Clean Air Act requires: 
[A state] to designate those areas within its boundaries where the air quality is 
better or worse than the NAAQS for each criteria pollutant, or where the air 
quality cannot be classified due to insufficient data. An area that meets the 
NAAQS for a particular pollutant is termed an “attainment” area; one that does 
not is termed a “non-attainment” area. 
Third Amended Intervenor Complaint ¶ 49, United States v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 
No. C2-99-1182 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 17, 2004). 
 64. Fact Sheet—Proposed Rule: Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V 
Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, supra note 58. 
 65. United States v. La. Generating, LLC, No. 09-100-JJB-CN, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
137973, at *6 (M.D. La. Dec. 1, 2011) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(1)-(8) (2006)). 
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Coal-fired plants that undertake major modifications to their facilities 
easily exceed the CAA regulation’s threshold of emitting at least “100 tons 
per year of any regulated pollutant, plus stationary and area sources” or 
emit smaller amounts of certain specified hazardous air pollutants.66 
Emission limitations depend, in part, upon whether the source is located in 
an attainment area or nonattainment area.67 A coal-fired plant located in a 
nonattainment area may be subject to NNSR permitting even if it “emit[s] 
as little as 50, 25, or 10 tons per year.”68 
The EPA mounted its nationwide civil punishment campaign against the 
coal-fired plants only after alternative legislative or enforcement strategies 
failed.69 The goals of the EPA enforcement initiative were to improve air 
quality, “reduce illness, protect lakes and streams,” and restore the 
environment.70 Our permitting violations study, presented in Part II of this 
article, is the first statistical analysis of penalties, civil mitigation, and 
compliance costs for consent decrees and settlements entered into under the 
EPA’s coal-fired plant enforcement initiative. 
In every EPA settlement in this study, the electricity generator agreed to 
reparative or restorative projects to address the harm it had caused to the 
public. One of the earliest cases arising out of the EPA’s coal-fired plant 
enforcement initiative, for example, was the 2003 settlement agreement 
with Alcoa.71 The EPA required Alcoa to undertake injunctive relief valued 
at $330 million, including retrofitting an existing plant with state-of-the-art 
                                                                                                                 
 66. MCCARTHY, supra note 40, at 15. 
 67. If a coal-fired plant is seeking a NNSR (Non-attainment New Source Review) 
permit, it “must meet stricter requirements than sources seeking PSD permits.” New York v. 
U.S. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Sources seeking NNSR permits 
“must achieve the ‘lowest achievable emission rate’ (‘LAER’) for new or modified units, 
whereas sources seeking PSD permits need only use the less demanding ‘best available 
control technology’ (‘BACT’). At a minimum, LAER and BACT are as restrictive as 
NSPS.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2000)). 
 68. MCCARTHY, supra note 40, at 15. 
 69. See The Power Plant Enforcement Effort, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ 
resources/cases/civil/caa/tvacoal-fired.html#powerplant (last visited Mar. 24, 2013) (“The 
total combined sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides emission reductions secured from these 
settlements will be well over 2 million tons each year once all the required pollution controls 
have been installed and when other required actions (such as unit retirements) have been 
implemented.”). 
 70. Complaint at 2, Sierra Club v. Duke Energy Ind., Inc., No. 108CV00437 (S.D. Ind. 
Apr. 3, 2008), 2008 WL 2548888; see also Complaint at 2, United States v. Alcoa Inc., No. 
103CV00222 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2003) 2003 WL 25757481. 
 71. Alcoa, Inc. Clean Air Act Settlement, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ 
resources/cases/civil/caa/alcoa.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
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pollution controls to eliminate sulfur dioxide.72 Alcoa also agreed to pay 
$1.5 million to the United States Treasury.73 
The Alcoa settlement incorporated concepts of restorative justice in 
addition to deterrence. Under the consent decree, Alcoa provided $2.5 
million to fund environmental projects such as retrofitting school buses in 
Texas with pollution control devices.74 In addition, Alcoa agreed to provide 
$1.75 million to the Trust for Public Lands to purchase and maintain 
property, to protect clean air, and to safeguard habitats for wildlife.75 
Alcoa’s creation of wildlife habitats exemplifies a polluting utility agreeing 
to fund environmental projects, thus achieving restorative justice’s goals of 
reparation and reconciliation.76 
II. Empirical Study of EPA Final Settlements with Coal-Fired Plants 
A. Methodology for Coal-Fired Plants Permitting Violations Study 
From the late 1970s through the 1990s, the coal-fired electricity industry 
often bypassed the costly permitting process when retrofitting power plants, 
thus circumventing its obligation to secure permits and minimize toxins. In 
the wake of this industry-wide defiance, on November 3, 1999, the United 
States Department of Justice and the EPA began their enforcement 
campaign by filing complaints against seven different utility giants.77 Our 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Id. (“On April 9, 2003, the Environmental Protection Agency and Department of 
Justice announced a major Clean Air Act settlement with Alcoa, Inc., under which the 
company will likely spend over $330 million to install state-of-the-art pollution controls to 
eliminate the vast majority of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions from the power 
plant at Alcoa’s aluminum production facility in Rockdale, Texas.”). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (requiring Alcoa to set aside “$1.75 million to the Trust for Public Lands, a 
national conservation organization, to purchase and maintain property designed to extend 
and protect the clean air, and the existing Houston toad habitat of the ‘Lost Pines[’]”). 
 76. The mediation projects that the coal-fired plants undertook were reparative. “With 
restorative justice, the verdict of punishment as a sign of counterfactual stabilisation [sic] of 
the norm finds a ‘functional equivalent’ in the compensation, or restoration of the damages 
and sufferings inflicted on the aggrieved party.” BRUNILDA PALI & CHRISTA PELIKAN, 
BUILDING SOCIAL SUPPORT FOR RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: MEDIA, CIVIL SOCIETY AND CITIZENS 
19 (2010), available at http://www.euforumrj.org/Projects/Final%20Report%20BSS.pdf. 
The public health harms are diffuse, statistical, and probabilistic, so it is difficult to have the 
true interaction between perpetrator and victim. Thus, the EPA settlements are a proxy for 
restorative justice augmenting civil penalties. 
 77. These actions were filed against major industry players including American Electric 
Power Company, Cinergy, FirstEnergy, Illinois Power, Southern Indiana Gas & Electric 
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empirical study analyzes all twenty-two final settlements with the EPA and 
the Department of Justice that resolved all claims where a utility failed to 
obtain a permit before making major modifications.78 These consent 
decrees and settlements for permitting violations were resolved between 
January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2011.79 
Each of these final settlements consisted of three components: (1) EPA 
civil penalties, (2) required mitigation projects, and (3) the cost of 
complying with injunctions.80 Means, medians, and modes were calculated 
for each component of the final settlement.81 The study provides a baseline 
                                                                                                                 
Company, Southern Company and Tampa Electric Company. Coal-Fired Power Plant 
Enforcement Initiative, supra note 10. 
 78. See id. (presenting civil judicial complaints, notices of violations, and administrative 
orders for coal-fired plant defendants). 
 79. See id. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to compute 
all empirical findings. IBM® SPSS® Statistics is a comprehensive set of data and predictive 
analytics tools used by social scientists, data analysts, and statistical programmers. To 
conduct our research, we completed a content analysis of every consent decree and 
settlement published by the EPA on its coal-fired plant initiative. In addition, we coded 
information such as the year, state, aggravated misconduct, and tons of pollutants reduced by 
the final settlements, as well as computed the size of the civil penalty assessed, cost of 
mitigation projects, cost of injunctive relief, and a grand total of these financial costs of 
noncompliance with EPA permitting regulations. When we coded the United States 
Department of Justice consent decrees and settlements, we employed the most conservative 
measures. We did not make adjustments for inflation over the past ten years. If the EPA 
reported a range for the cost of mitigation projects or injunctive relief, we reported the 
lowest value on the range. If a given component of recovery was not reported, we recorded 
“zero” even though this conservative assumption underestimates the costs. Our findings on 
the size of past civil penalties, mitigation projects, and injunctive relief reflect a complete 
universe, rather than a statistical sample, of decided cases. 
 80. All twenty-two coal-fired plants had violated the Clean Air Act’s Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration/Nonattainment New Source Review provisions, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
7470-92, 7501-15. These provisions require plant owners to obtain permits and implement 
pollution technology controls to minimize air toxics. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-92, 7501-15 
(2006).  
 81. The mean (average), median, and mode are the measures of central tendency 
generally used in statistical analysis. The mean is the average value in a distribution, 
whereas the mode is the most frequent score in a data set. The median is the value that 
divides the distribution exactly into halves—50% are below it, and 50% are above it. The 
median may not actually occur in the distribution, but is the “balance point” of the 
distribution. The principal advantage of the median is that it is unaffected by outliers, as the 
mean is and the mode can be. In distributions that are clearly skewed, such as the cost of 
injunction compliance, the median provides a better estimate of what the typical penalty is. 
For example, a single multi-billion dollar award will inflate the averages (mean) but will 
have little impact on the midpoint (median). The mode did not offer a useful measure of 
central tendency in such a small sample, but was reported when it shed light on the data. 
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that may be employed by courts when calibrating civil penalties, mitigation 
costs, and injunctive relief in future enforcement actions.82 Appendix A lists 
all twenty-two settling companies by name, aggravating circumstances, size 
of civil penalties, cost of mitigation, cost of compliance with the injunction, 
and federal court citation for each coal-fired plant violator.83 
B. Empirical Findings on the EPA’s Final Settlements with Utilities 
The twenty-two settling utilities consisted of three government owned, 
fourteen investor owned, and five cooperative or nonprofit utility owned 
entities. For the twelve cases where megawatt capacities (MW) were 
reported, the coal-fired plants ranged from 212 to 27,000 megawatts. The 
agreed upon reductions in tons of air contaminants (not hazardous 
pollutants but rather conventional pollutants) ranged from 1845 tons per 
year to 231,000 tons per year. Table 1 presents three measures of central 
tendency (mean, median, and mode) for the three parts of each consent or 
settlement agreement: (1) amount allocated to civil penalties; (2) cost of 
civil mitigation penalties ordered by the court; and (3) cost to the defendant 
utility of complying with ordered injunctive relief. Many of these coal-fired 
plant cases required utilities to pay hundreds of millions of dollars, which 
sends a clear deterrent message. 
 
FINDING #1: SETTLEMENTS AVERAGED MORE THAN $760 
MILLION  
 
Table 1 illustrates why EPA enforcement is a hot button issue for the 
electricity industry. The twenty-two settlements cost the defendants a total 
of more than $16.7 billion. The mean (average) total cost (civil penalty plus 
mitigation costs plus injunctive costs) for the twenty-two settlements was 
                                                                                                                 
 82. We also compiled data on tons of air toxics reduced in these cases and its 
association with the size of the remedy. The permitting violation database also contains 
information on the year of the penalty, state or jurisdiction, type of air toxics emitted, and 
any aggravating circumstances. Our empirical research uncovered no cases where a coal-
fired plant or other utility had been assessed fines for failing to seek a MACT determination 
because most coal-fired plants were grandfathered in and had no requirement to comply with 
CAA section 112 until they undertook major modifications. Professor Hsu explains that the 
problem with grandfathering is that it creates a regulatory environment where extant 
facilities have “an incentive to keep old, grandfathered facilities up and running.” Shi Ling 
Hsu, What’s Old Is New: The Problem With New Source Review, REGULATION, Spring 2006, 
at 36, 38, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv29n1/v29n1-1.pdf. 
 83. A comprehensive account of each of the consent decrees and settlements is found at 
Coal-Fired Power Plant Enforcement Initiative, supra note 10. 
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$762.1 million, over three quarters of a billion dollars per settlement. The 
median cost of complying with the injunction was $368.5 million. These 
substantial costs do not take into account the utilities’ legal expenses such 
as attorney’s fees, payments to experts, and other litigation costs.  
 

















N Valid 22 22 22 22 
 Missing 0 0 0 0 
Mean $3,590,909 $27,990,909 $730,681,818 $762,145,454 
Median $1,875,000 $6,125,000 $368,500,000 $375,600,000 
Mode $850,000 $2,500,000 0 14,000,000 
Sum $79,000,000 $615,800,000 $16,075,000,000 16,767,200,000 
     
 
(Source: EPA Coal-Fired Plant Enforcement Initiative (2000-2011)) 
 
FINDING #2: CIVIL PENALTIES WERE THE SMALLEST 
COMPONENT OF THE SETTLEMENTS 
 
The lowest civil penalty imposed on settling utilities for permitting 
violations was $100,000 while the largest was $15 million.85 The mean civil 
                                                                                                                 
 84. We employed the most conservative assumptions in computing the cost of 
mitigation projects and injunctive relief. For example, in a case where the violator’s cost of 
complying with the injunction had a range of three billion dollars to five billion dollars, we 
chose the lower number. If no dollar figure was reported for either the mitigation or 
injunctive relief, we coded the amount as zero. 
 85. These numbers may understate the true cost because a violator has tax incentives to 
minimize the amount allocated to civil penalties. Civil penalties are not tax deductible, 
whereas expenditures for civil mitigation projects and compliance with injunctions may be 
written off as business expenses. The principal federal tax code provision authorizing the 
deductibility of settlement payments to government agencies is 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2006). 
Section 162(a) allows a deduction of “all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or 
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.” I.R.C. § 162(a) 
(2006). See generally 2000 I.R.S. N.S.A.R. 10768, 2000 WL 34416689 (June 1, 2000) 
(“Payments to settle a claim against a corporation in a lawsuit have been held to be ordinary 
and necessary business expenses as long as the payments were a reasonable way of 
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penalty payment was $3.6 million, with a median payment of $1.9 million. 
The sum of all civil penalties assessed was $79 million, a relatively small 
amount when compared with the money expended by these electricity 
producers for mitigation projects, which totaled $615.8 million. Settling 
coal-fired plant permitting disputes cost utilities an average of twenty-eight 
million dollars for mitigation projects alone. The median cost for mitigation 
projects ordered was $6.1 million. The total sum for the cost of utilities 
complying with injunctions was $16.1 billion. 
The EPA imposes civil penalties if a plant began construction or 
embarked on a major modification without obtaining a valid permit.86 A 
court’s penalty assessment ideally captures the full social cost of a utility’s 
conscious disregard of its duty to apply for a MACT determination. Section 
120 of the CAA provides for augmented remedies for “delayed compliance 
orders, designed to deprive the polluter of any financial savings realized as 
a result of delayed compliance with the law.”87 When starting with the 
maximum penalty, courts will typically consider the factors described in 42 
U.S.C. § 7413 to determine whether there is any reason to mitigate the 
punishment.88 Failure to seek permitting to implement MACT is likely to be 
the result of an impermissible cost/benefit analysis that trades public health 
for short-term profits. In cases where a utility has purely economic reasons 
for noncompliance with EPA permitting, the willful violation will be 
considered an aggravating factor.89 
Section 113(b) of the CAA allowed plaintiffs to seek up to $32,500 per 
day for violations between March 15, 2004, and January 12, 2009.90 After 
January 12, 2009, the maximum penalty was increased to $37,500 per 
                                                                                                                 
protecting the corporation or mitigating potential damages.”). This provision, however, 
contains an important limitation. Under section 162(f), a deduction is disallowed for a “fine 
or similar penalty paid to a government for the violation of any law.” I.R.C. § 162(f).  
 86. EPA, PERMIT PENALTY POLICY FOR VIOLATIONS OF REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO 
NEW AND MODIFIED SOURCES UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT, at 2-3 (Feb. 3, 1981), available at 
www.envinfo.com/caain/enforcement/caad8.html. 
 87. FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ch. 2, § 3 (Matthew Bender 
2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (2006)). 
 88. Pound v. Airosol Co., 498 F.3d 1089, 1095 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating principle that a 
court begins with the maximum penalty and then examines 42 U.S.C. § 7413 in order to 
determine whether there is a basis for mitigation). 
 89. See Clean Air Act Stationary Source Civil Penalty Policy, EPA, 16 (Oct. 25, 1991), 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/caa/stationary/penpol.pdf [hereinafter 
Civil Penalty Policy] (treating degree of willfulness or negligence as an aggravating factor in 
assessing penalties). 
 90. 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (2012). 
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day.91 In determining penalties, a utility is liable for each day of its 
continuing violation from the time it began construction or modification 
without a permit until it secures its MACT approval (if ever).92 This 
duration factor likely accounts for some of the variation in the size of civil 
penalties, as do the electricity generator’s overall wealth and size of 
operations. 
 
FINDING #3: MITIGATION PROJECTS COST THE SETTLING 
DEFENDANTS AN AVERAGE OF $28 MILLION, ALMOST EIGHT 
TIMES MORE THAN WHAT THEY PAID FOR CIVIL PENALTIES 
 
In the Clean Air Act settlements we studied, mitigation costs far 
outweighed the monetary value of civil penalties imposed. Typically, these 
mitigation projects require the settling utility to develop a schedule for 
implementing the projects.93 Mitigation projects were more than 7.8 times 
more costly than civil penalties in coal-fired plant permitting cases.  
 Table 1 reveals that the median cost for the ordered civil mitigation 
projects was $6.1 million for the twenty-two settlements but, as shown in 
Table 2 (below), the costs of these remedial projects varied widely. Almost 
three-quarters of the coal-fired plant settlements mandated more than four 
million dollars for civil mitigation projects, with half of the defendants 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Id. (showing penalty adjustments and including table showing penalties effective 
March 15, 2004, through January 12, 2009, as $32,500 per day and penalties after January 
12, 2009, as $37,500 per day). 
 92. In United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., the Court explained the importance 
of considering duration of an offense when imposing civil penalties: 
It seems apparent that acquisition in violation of an FTC order banning 
“acquiring” certain assets could be such a violation. Any anticompetitive effect 
of an acquisition continues as long as the assets obtained are retained, and the 
violator could undo or minimize any such effect by disposing of the assets at 
any time after the initial transaction. On the other hand, if violation of an order 
prohibiting “acquiring” assets were treated as a single violation, any deterrent 
effect of the penalty provisions would be entirely undermined, and the penalty 
would be converted into a minor tax upon a violation which could reap large 
financial benefits to the perpetrator. As we have seen, Congress added the 
continuing-penalty provisions precisely to avoid such a result. 
420 U.S. 223, 232-33 (1975) (discussing the “‘continuing failure or neglect to obey’” 
provision of section 45(l) of the Federal Trade Commission Act and the like provision 
included in the Clayton Act in 1959). 
 93. Dairyland Power Cooperative Settlement, EPA (June 29, 2012), http://www.epa. 
gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/dairylandpower.html (describing how mitigation 
projects work in Clean Air Act settlements). 
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paying more than six million dollars for civil mitigation to settle their cases. 
The lowest amount spent for mitigation projects was $400,000 while the 
largest sum for mitigation projects was $350 million. The modal settlement 
amount for civil mitigation projects was $2.5 million. 
Table 2: Civil Mitigation Costs in Quartiles 
Violator’s Cost of Ordered 









6 27.3 27.3 27.3 
 $4,000,001 to 
$6,000,000 
 
5 22.7 22.7 50.0 
 $6,000,001 to 
$15,000,000 
 
6 27.3 27.3 77.3 
 Above 
$15,000,000 5 22.7 22.7 100.0 
  
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
 Many settling utilities agreed to undertake multi-million dollar 
expenditures to retrofit or repower extant generating units as a condition of 
settling their cases. In some EPA permitting cases, utilities voluntarily 
retired their electrical generating units (EGUs) rather than pay the cost of 
compliance such as installing state-of-the art pollution controls.94 Older 
coal-fired plants were the most likely to retire their power generating units 
instead of undertaking expensive retrofitting projects. The energy industry 
blames the EPA coal-fired plant initiative, combined with falling energy 
prices, for the loss of jobs and potential energy shortfalls.95 Defenders of 
                                                                                                                 
 94. See, e.g., Northern Indiana Public Service Company Clean Air Act Settlement, 
supra note 28 (agreeing to voluntarily retire the Dean H. Mitchell station as part of the 
settlement as opposed to retrofitting it to comply with Clean Air Act permitting 
requirements); Duke Energy Gallagher Plant Settlement, EPA (Dec. 22, 2009), 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/dukeenergy.html (giving Duke 
Electric an option to “elect to either permanently shutdown [sic] or repower the units to burn 
natural gas instead of coal”). 
 95. Kevin Begos, 5 Pa. Coal-Fired Power Plants to Close, YAHOO! (Mar. 1, 2012, 10:59 
AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/5-pa-coal-fired-power-231156108.html (“Tougher air 
quality rules from the Environmental Protection Agency are forcing some companies to choose 
between costly upgrades, closing older plants or building new power plants that can also run on 
cleaner-burning natural gas.”); see also Joseph Baker, Out with the Old: More Coal-Fired 
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the EPA counter that the retired plants are old, inefficient, and 
economically marginal.96 Retrofitting or retiring generating units improved 
the quality of the air all Americans breathe. 
 
FINDING #4: THE COST OF COMPLYING WITH INJUNCTIONS WAS 
TWENTY-SIX TIMES THE COST OF MITIGATION PROJECTS AND 
200 TIMES THE DOLLAR VALUE ATTRIBUTED TO CIVIL 
PENALTIES 
 
The largest component of a coal-fired power plant settlement, by far, was 
the estimated cost of complying with the EPA ordered injunction. As 
Table 1 shows, compliance costs were more than twenty-six times the 
utilities’ expenditures for mitigation projects and more than 200 times more 
costly than civil penalties. Table 3 below reports the costs of installation of 
appropriate pollution controls, further remedial measures, and other monies 
paid by the violators in compliance with consent decrees. 
 As Table 3 reveals, the price of wrongdoing was significant in coal-fired 
plant permitting violation actions. The average cost for a violator to comply 
with injunctive relief in the twenty-two cases was $730.7 million. The 
median cost of compliance for settling utilities was $368.5 million. For 
example, in its 2007 settlement with the EPA, Nevada Power agreed to 
install pollution controls at an estimated cost of sixty million dollars, which 
will reduce nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions “by about 2,300 tons per year 
from 2004-2005 levels, an 86% reduction.”97 The EPA’s “$1.2 billion 
settlement with the Virginia Electric Power Co. (VEPCO) will eliminate 
                                                                                                                 
Generation Closures Announced, ENERGY BOOM (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.energyboom.com/ 
emerging/out-old-more-coal-fired-generation-closures-announced (“Shutting down old and 
seemingly dirty, out of date coal generation is a growing trend among big utilities in the United 
States. Most claim that President Obama and his Administration are hurting Americans by 
imposing new emission standards and closing these generation facilities, as these closures will 
leave serious gaps in needed electricity.”). 
 96. Jim DiPeso, Old Coal Plants Shift Blame as Well as Costs, DAILY GREEN (Feb. 29, 
2012, 6:07 PM), http://www.thedailygreen.com/environmental-news/blogs/republican/coal-
woes-linked-to-market (“The sharp decline in natural gas prices, the rising cost of coal, and 
reduced demand for electricity are all contributing factors in the decisions to retire some of 
the country’s oldest coal-fired generating units. These trends started well before EPA issued 
its new air pollution rules.” (quoting a report by energy analyst Susan Tierney) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 97. U.S. Announces $60.7 Million Clean Air Act Settlement with Nevada Power, EPA 
(June 13, 2007), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/e87e8bc7fd0c11f1852572a0006 
50c05/507b7edf4c7f52a5852572f90065d491!OpenDocument. 
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237,000 tons of air pollution each year from eight coal-fired power plants in 
Virginia and West Virginia.”98 
Table 3: Utilities’ Cost of Compliance with Permitting Injunction 







 2 9.1 9.1   9.1 
$30 million 1 4.5 4.5 13.6 
$60 million 1 4.5 4.5 18.2 
$85 million 1 4.5 4.5 22.7 
$100 million 1 4.5 4.5 27.3 
$135 million 1 4.5 4.5 31.8 
$200 million 1 4.5 4.5 36.4 
$275 million 1 4.5 4.5 40.9 
$330 million 1 4.5 4.5 45.5 
$337 million 1 4.5 4.5 50.0 
$400 million 2 9.1 9.1 59.1 
$500 million 1 4.5 4.5 63.6 
$520 million 1 4.5 4.5 68.2 
$600 million 2 9.1 9.1 77.3 
$603 million 1 4.5 4.5 81.8 
$1.1 billion 1 4.5 4.5 86.4 
$1.2 billion 1 4.5 4.5 90.9 
$4 billion 1 4.5 4.5 95.5 
$4.6 billion 1 4.5 4.5    100.0 
  
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
 The EPA not only punishes and deters utilities for past violations; it also 
requires utilities to retrofit, retire, or undertake other costly measures to 
improve air quality. Northern Indiana Public Service Company’s (NIPSCO) 
Clean Air Act settlement included $9.5 million in environmental projects to 
atone for “the impacts of past emissions.”99 NIPSCO’s ordered 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Fact Sheet: 2003 Environmental Enforcement Accomplishments, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE (July 21, 2003), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2003/July/03_enrd_431.htm. 
 99. Northern Indiana Public Service Company Clean Air Act Settlement, supra note 28. 
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environmental mitigation projects include “Clean Diesel Retrofit, 
Woodstove/Outdoor Boiler Changeout, and Land Acquisition and 
Restoration projects. The remaining money [could] be spent on the 
Hybrid/Electric Fleet, Electric Infrastructure, and Electric to Natural Gas 
Conversion projects.”100 Each NIPSCO remedial project pays back its direct 
victims who reside near the utility’s facilities. Moreover, NIPSCO agreed to 
a clean diesel retrofit project through which it will upgrade public diesel 
engines to minimize “emissions of NOx and volatile organic compounds 
(VOCs).”101 NIPSCO’s other reparative projects include woodstove and 
outdoor boiler upgrades, restoration of the Indiana Dunes National 
Lakeshore, and the submission of plans for a hybrid fleet.102 
 
 FINDING #5: THE TOTAL COST TO SETTLE IS HIGHLY 
CORRELATED WITH THE NUMBER OF PLANTS COVERED 
 
Table 4: Scattergram and Symmetrical Measures of the Relationship 
Between a Coal-Fired Plant Violator’s Number of Plants Covered by 





                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. A line of best fit is a proxy for a trend line that represents the data on a scatter plot. 
Outliers are data points located far away from the best fit line. “When performing least 
squares fitting [a method of determining the line of best fit] to data, it is often best to discard 
outliers before computing the line of best fit.” Eric Weisstein, Outlier, WOLFRAM RESEARCH, 
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Outlier.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013) (emphasis added).  
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Table 4 shows that civil penalties vary with the utility’s number of 
noncompliant plants addressed in the settlement agreement. This is logical. 
The number of plants covered by a consent decree is a proxy for the assets 
of the violator as well as the amount of pollutants emitted by the utility. The 
scatter plot in Table 4 depicts a near linear relationship between the number 
of plants covered by permitting violations and the size of the costs 
expended to settle the case. The Pearson’s r105 of 0.935 indicates a very 
strong positive correlation between the size of the penalties assessed and 
the number of plants covered by the decree.106 A Spearman correlation was 
also computed to adjust for the skewness of the data and the small sample 
size.107 A correlation of 0.775 again demonstrates a strong positive 
                                                                                                                 
 104. This calculation does not assume the null hypothesis and employs the asymptotic 
standard error assuming the null hypothesis based on normal approximation. 
 105. The Pearson’s r correlation tests the magnitude and direction of the association 
between the size of EPA civil penalties imposed and the number of plants included in the 
settlements and consent decrees of section 112 permit violators. This measure is appropriate 
where two variables are on an interval or a ratio scale, such as dollar size of EPA civil 
penalties and the violator’s number of coal-fired plants covered by the decree. The Pearson’s 
r correlation coefficient is a number between +1 and -1. This number is useful in 
determining the magnitude and direction of the association between two variables. 
 106. The Pearson’s r correlation measures the strength of the correlation between number 
of plants and the grand total of dollars paid by past permit violators. The closer the 
correlation is to +1 or -1, the stronger the correlation is. Thus an r of 0.935 is statistically 
significant at below the 0.001 level. The probability level of 0.001 means that there is only a 
1 in a 1000 chance that this relation is a chance occurrence. The number of plants is a proxy 
for size of the violator’s operations, which is a critically important factor in achieving 
optimal deterrence. 
 107. The Spearman Rank Order Correlation coefficient, rs, is a non-parametric measure 
of the strength and direction of association that exists between two variables measured on at 
least an ordinal scale. It is denoted by the symbol rs (or the Greek letter [ρ], pronounced 
rho). The test is used for either ordinal variables or for interval data that has failed the 
assumptions necessary for conducting the Pearson’s product-moment correlation. 
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Error Approx. T Approx. Sig. 
Interval by Interval Pearson’s r .935 .036 11.797 .000 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman 
Correlation .775 .104 5.485 .000 
N of Valid Cases104 22       
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss3/3
2013]    RESTORATIVE JUSTICE TO SUPPLEMENT PUNISHMENT 455 
 
 
statistical relationship108 between the total amount that a violator paid to 
settle its case and the number of plants.109 
Table 5 below depicts the Pearson’s r and Spearman correlation representing 
the association between the violator’s number of plants covered by the 
settlement agreement and total expenditures to comply with the injunction with 
the two largest settlements omitted. This table consists of only twenty of the 
twenty-two cases because the two very large outliers were removed from the 
analysis as these outsized settlements might unreasonably skew the result 
upward. These statistical outliers are the $4.675 billion total costs in the 2007 
American Electrical Power settlement and the $4.36 billion grand total in the 
Tennessee Valley Authority settlement of 2011.110  
 
Table 5: The Relationship Between Number of Plants and Total Costs 
Expended with Two Largest Outliers Excluded (N=20) 
 
  
                                                                                                                 
 108. Online Statistics, Introduction to Bivariate Data, http://onlinestatbook.com/chapter4/ 
pearson.html (describing a strong positive relationship indicated by a high positive Pearson’s 
r correlation). 
 109. As with the Pearson’s r, the Spearman correlation indicates a positive direction and 
a strong association between number of plants and costs expended. In general, the greater the 
number of plants covered by a settlement or consent decree, the greater the defendant’s 
overall expenditure. However, the scatter plot reveals two outliers in the top right corner, 
which are the multi-billion dollar costs in the Tennessee Valley Authority and American 
Electrical Power cases. The scatter plot in Table 5 excludes the two large multi-billion dollar 
awards.  
 110. To get a better picture of the association between plant size and costs imposed on 
violators, the Pearson’s r was recalculated without these two multi-billion dollar settlements 
as illustrated in Table 5. Even without these two outliers, the relationship between number of 
plants and the settlement costs remains extremely strong. 
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Even with the two outliers removed, the 0.803 Pearson’s r score reveals that 
the greater the number of plants, the larger the total cost to the defendant in 
settling the permitting violation.111 As with Table 4, the Spearman Rank 
Order Correlation was computed. Table 5 reveals that the Spearman 
correlation is statistically significant at the 0.001 level and the relationship 
is positive at 0.694.112 The total cost varies depending upon the defendant 
utility’s number of coal-fired plants in violation covered by the settlement 
agreement. 
 
FINDING #6: THE MEAN CIVIL PENALTY, MITIGATION 
PROJECTS, AND COST OF COMPLIANCE ARE ALL LOWER FOR 
SINGLE PLANTS VERSUS VIOLATORS WHOSE DECREES 
COVERED MULTIPLE PLANTS 
 
Table 6 below represents the eleven coal-fired permitting cases in which 
the settlement applied to permitting violations at a single electricity plant as 
opposed to multiple facilities. Single plants paid smaller penalties than 
utilities with several different noncompliant facilities. In the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA) case, for example, the civil penalty was ten million 
dollars to settle all claims against the defendant for permitting offenses at 
eleven different TVA plants located in Alabama, Kentucky, and 
Tennessee.113 In contrast, the Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company 
                                                                                                                 
 111. The positive correlation indicates that as the number of plants increases, the size of 
the grand total r also increases. A negative correlation would have indicated that the two 
variables had a negative relationship (as one increased, the other decreased). 
 112. The Spearman correlation demonstrates a statistically significant relationship 
between the size of the violator and size of expenditures to settle its permitting violation case 
at the 0.001 level. Like the Pearson’s r score, the Spearman correlation measures the 
direction and size of the association between the number of a violator’s plants and what the 
coal plant owner paid to settle the case (penalty plus mitigation plus cost of compliance with 
the injunction). 
 113. Tennessee Valley Authority Clean Air Act Settlement, supra note 11; see also Letter 
from John H. Hankinson, Jr., Reg’l Adm’r, EPA to Joseph Bynam [sic], Exec. Vice 
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Error Approx. T Approx. Sig. 
Interval by Interval Pearson’s r .803 .082 5.714 .000 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman 
Correlation .694 .127 4.090 .001 
N of Valid Cases  20       
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paid a $600,000 fine for permitting violations at a single plant.114 This 
finding demonstrates that the EPA considers the number of generating units 
in calibrating punishment. 









Estimated Cost of 
Compliance with 
Injunction 
Grand Total of All 




Valid 11 11 11 11 
  Missing 0 0 0 0 
Mean $1,113,636 $5,195,455 $194,090,910 $200,163,636 
Median $950,000 $5,000,000 $135,000,000 $139,400,000 




$12,250,000 $57,150,000 $2,135,000,000 $2,201,800,000 
 
As Table 6 reveals, the mean civil penalty for single plant violators 
(N=11) was $1.1 million, which is less than one-third of the average 
penalty for all twenty-two violators as shown in Table 1. The mean cost of 
mitigation projects, $28 million, was 5.39 times larger for the full sample 
than the $5.2 million expended by single plant violators. The mean cost of 
compliance in single plant settlements was $194.1 million, which was only 
27% of the comparable costs of the average violator in the complete sample 
($730.7 million). The total average cost to settle single plant cases was 
$200.2 million. Even single plant violators paid a heavy price for not 
seeking a permit before commencing major modifications in their plants but 
multiple plant settlements were considerably more costly. 
Courts weigh the magnitude of the construction project and the plant 
owner’s assets in determining the size of the penalty necessary to achieve 
                                                                                                                 
President, Tenn. Valley Auth. Fossil Power Group (n.d.), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/tvamemo.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
 114. Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company (SIGECO) F.B. Culley Plant Clean 
Air Act Settlement, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/sigecofb. 
html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
 115. There is more than one modal value in Table 6. Following the standard statistical 
practice, only the smallest value is depicted. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
458 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:427 
 
 
deterrence. The EPA penalty must dissuade an offender from engaging in 
an impermissible cost-benefit analysis by balancing the cost of complying 
with the MACT permitting process against corporate profits. Notably, 
section 7413 of the CAA does not provide courts with guidance for 
determining the assessment of penalties, giving judges considerable 
discretion in calibrating civil penalties.116 Our statistical findings 
demonstrate that courts consider the financial circumstances of a utility in 
setting the per-day penalty to achieve deterrence.117 Courts may take 
judicial notice of the violator’s ability to pay based upon a utility’s forward 
contracts anticipating a new or modified facility. Alternatively, a court may 
determine wealth by considering other financial metrics including low 
variable costs, forward energy contracts, or other measures of strong 
forward cash flows. 
 
FINDING #7: THE LARGER THE UTILITY, THE BETTER ITS 
ABILITY TO PAY AND THE GREATER THE HARM CAUSED BY 
THE FAILURE TO EMPLOY THE BEST AVAILABLE ANTI-
POLLUTION TECHNOLOGY 
 
Our empirical evidence reveals that civil penalties generally increase 
with the amount of environmental damage. The number of plants—a good 
proxy for the size of the violator’s operations and ultimately the amount of 
emitted air toxics—is a highly significant predictor for the size of penalties, 
mitigation costs, and injunctive costs. Congress requires courts to consider 
the size of the business because of the obvious relationship of this factor to 
deterrence goals.118 These factors point to a strong positive correlation 
                                                                                                                 
 116. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (2006). 
 117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979) (“Punitive damages may be 
awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his 
reckless indifference to the rights of others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact 
can properly consider the character of the defendant’s act, the nature and extent of the harm 
to the plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to cause and the wealth of the 
defendant.”). 
 118. The EPA has adopted numerous guidance documents explaining its interpretation of 
the CAA’s section 113 penalty assessment criteria and how it intends to apply the criteria. 
EPA’s Clean Air Act Stationary Source Civil Penalty Policy was issued in 1984 and last 
revised in 1991. See Civil Penalty Policy, supra note 89, at 1. The Penalty Policy states that 
it “reflects the factors enumerated in Section 113(e) that the court (in Section 113(b) actions) 
and the Administrator (in Section 113(d) actions) shall take into consideration in the 
assessment of any penalty.” Id. The Penalty Policy highlights the importance of recovering 
the economic benefit of the violation and of considering the gravity of the violation. Id. at 4-
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between the amount of electricity produced and the size of the EPA’s 
penalty. 
Table 7: Past Permitting Violation Cases Where the Facilities in Question 
Had Less than 850 Megawatt Capacity 
 









4 $4,900,000 $15,000,000 $31,150,000 $7,787,500 $4,847,400,506 
 
Estimated Cost of 
Compliance with 
Injunction 











Valid N (listwise) 
 
4 
     
 
Tables 7 and 8 demonstrate that there is, in fact, a strong relationship 
between the amounts of electricity produced, the excess pollution emitted, 
and the civil penalty assessed. For the four smallest coal plants (less than 
850 megawatts), the average megawattage was 537 (the median was 618). 
Table 7 shows that, for these low megawattage plants, the mean civil 
penalty was $887,500 and the median civil penalty was $850,000. The 
mean cost of mitigation projects for these small coal-fired plants was $7.8 
million. The estimated cost of complying with the injunctive relief for this 
sample was $96.3 million.119 
 
                                                                                                                 
8. It refers to these considerations as the “preliminary deterrence amount.” Id. at 4. The 
policy includes an appendix that specifies a method for calculating economic benefit, which 
includes consideration of delayed and avoided cost. Id. at 4-6. It also specifies factors to be 
considered in determining the gravity of the violation, which the policy states are “designed 
to reflect [the factors] listed in Section 113(e) of the Act.” Id. at 9. The listed factors include: 
“actual or possible harm,” “the amount of pollutant[s]” emitted, “sensitivity of the 
environment,” “toxicity of the pollutant[s],” length of the violation, and “size of [the] 
violator.” Id. at 9-10. 
 119. One cautionary note is that complete data on the megawattage was only reported for 
twelve of the twenty-two cases in the study. 
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FINDING #8: THERE IS A LINEAR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE SIZE OF CIVIL PENALTIES AND TONS OF AIR TOXINS 
REDUCED BY THE SETTLEMENTS 
 
As the scattergram in Table 8 illustrates, the EPA and the United States 
Department of Justice imposed civil penalties that are roughly proportional 
to the amount of excessive preventable air toxins created by the permitting 
violation.120 The enforcement actions resulted in an average of 120,725 
fewer tons of atmospheric toxics. This linear relationship suggests that the 
EPA penalty policy is not applied arbitrarily, but rather reflects true societal 
harm. 
 





















Courts apply common sense in raising the price of wrongdoing to make 
the wealthiest and most serious polluters think twice before they construct  
 
                                                                                                                 
 120. One note of caution is that the case settlements did not report reduced particulate 
toxics, mercury, or other noxious air pollutants. A more complete study would examine 
whether this statistical relationship held for other toxics reduced. Such an analysis is beyond 
the scope of this article. 
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or modify their plants without the proper permits. The lowest quartile for 
settling a coal-fired permitting case ranged from fourteen million dollars to 
$105.9 million.121 The monotonic relationship between air toxic reduction 
and expenditures confirms that the reduced tonnage of air pollutants is an 
important predictor of the penalties paid by utilities. 
For the EPA Coal-Fired Plant Initiative as a whole, the enforcement 
actions have resulted in an average of 134,344 fewer tons of toxics in the 
air Americans breathe.122 The median reduction in SO2 and NOx per year 
reduced by each EPA settlement or consent decree entered into by coal-
fired plants is 57,000 tons of air toxins.123 Deterrence in federal 
environmental law requires that large polluters pay a high cost for 
wrongdoing and our empirical data confirms that the EPA’s initiative is 
based upon deterrence-based punishment. 
In the largest of the twenty-two coal-fired plant settlements, American 
Electric Power (AEP) agreed to comply with an injunction requiring the 
company to reduce its emissions by 813,000 tons of pollutants per year 
(tpy) “at an estimated cost of more than $4.6 billion.”124 This record 
settlement obligated AEP to implement technology that would lower the 
level of nitrogen oxides for each calendar year from 2009 to 2016.125 AEP’s 
settlement also required it to reduce annual tonnage of air toxic emissions 
from 450,000 tpy to 174,000 tpy from 2010 to 2019, with additional 
reductions each year afterwards.126 To achieve these reductions, AEP 
                                                                                                                 
 121. A larger sample is needed to determine whether the cost of wrongdoing is correlated 
with the amount of electricity produced.  
 122. We computed the number of tons of toxics by developing a frequency distribution 
based on data reported in the Clean Air Act Settlements. See Coal-Fired Power Plant 
Enforcement Initiative, supra note 10 (all data from January 1, 2003, through April 14, 2011, 
was included in our analysis). 
 123. These tonnage estimates are drawn from the EPA reports of settlements and consent 
decrees. 
 124. American Electric Power Service Corporation Information Sheet, EPA (Oct. 9, 2007), 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/americanelectricpower1007.html. 
 125. Id. (“In 2006, nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions at these 16 plants totaled 231,000 
tons per year. By 2016, these AEP emissions will be reduced to 72,000 tons per year, 
continuing in perpetuity. In 2006, sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions at these 16 plants totaled 
828,000 tons per year. By 2018, these AEP emissions will be reduced to 174,000 tons per 
year, continuing in perpetuity. This SO2 reduction—from a single settlement—is more than 
the SO2 emitted from most states (45 out of 50). This reduction in emissions is one of the 
largest percentage decreases achieved in any of the United States’ prior settlements with 
coal-fired electric utilities, and it reflects a multibillion dollar investment by AEP.”). 
 126. Id. 
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agreed to install and continuously operate pollution controls in each 
electrical generating unit in its system.127 
The EPA also ordered AEP to disburse sixty million dollars to fund 
projects to mitigate the adverse effects of its past emissions, which dwarfed 
AMP’s costs of mitigation.128 These restorative expenditures were 
subdivided into a federal share for mitigation projects (sixty percent) and a 
state share (forty percent).129 AEP’s projects included both the purchase and 
restoration of sensitive lands in several Eastern states and improvements in 
emissions reduction and nitrogen loading to Chesapeake Bay:130 
AEP made physical and operational changes at nine of its plants 
that constituted “major modifications” without first undergoing 
PSD review or Non-attainment New Source Review (NNSR), 
obtaining required permits, and installing and operating Best 
Available Control Technology and/or technology reflecting the 
Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER) to reduce air 
pollution.131 
The findings from this study provide a valuable baseline for calibrating 
just penalties in future EPA permitting cases. Congress recognizes that 
larger CAA penalties are necessary to deter larger utilities.132 The EPA’s 
Uniform Civil Penalty Policy requires size to be considered as a proxy for 
the defendant’s “ability to pay,” as a factor in calibrating civil penalties.133 
Our empirical examination reveals that, in fact, courts do approve decrees 
where the civil penalties generally increase relative to the size of the 
business. The number of plants, a good proxy for business size, is also a 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. The idea was that AEP would “restore or improve watersheds and forests in national 
parks adversely affected by past emissions; reduce nitrogen loading to Chesapeake Bay 
through actions such as the acquisition of buffer zones” and take additional actions in 
twenty-four states. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Civil Penalty Policy, supra note 89, at 9. 
 133. See, e.g., Memorandum from Thomas L. Adams Jr., Assistant Adm’r for 
Enforcement & Compliance Monitoring, EPA to Assistant & Reg’l Adm’rs (Dec. 16, 1986), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/enforcement/documents/policies/civilpenalty-violators.pdf 
(noting that the policy applies to the calculation of civil penalties that the EPA imposes on 
for-profit publicly held or closely held entities and for-profit entities owned by not-for-profit 
entities). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss3/3
2013]    RESTORATIVE JUSTICE TO SUPPLEMENT PUNISHMENT 463 
 
 
highly significant predictor of civil penalty size, mitigation expenses, and 
injunctive costs.  
III. The Integration of Deterrence and Restorative Justice-Based 
Enforcement into EPA Final Settlements 
The data presented in Part II demonstrate that penalties are calibrated to 
the size, harm, and number of plants under the settlement decree, which is 
consistent with deterrence-based civil enforcement.134 The EPA policy on 
civil penalties, dating from February 16, 1984, establishes deterrence as the 
EPA’s primary goal in imposing civil punishment.135 In the standard law 
and economics model of deterrence, companies are profit maximizers that 
rationally choose their “environmental performance by balancing the 
expected costs of polluting with the expected benefits of doing so.”136 
Courts must set penalties at a level high enough to discourage a utility from 
                                                                                                                 
 134. See CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING 
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 102 (2003); 
Markell, supra note 43, at 3; Marc Melnick & Elizabeth Willes, Comment, Watching the 
Candy Store: EPA Overfiling of Local Air Pollution Variances, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 252 
(1993). 
 135. EPA, POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES: EPA GENERAL ENFORCEMENT POLICY GM-21, at 
3 (1984), available at http://www.epa.gov/enforcement/documents/policies/epapolicy-civil 
penalties021684.pdf. The methodology for assessing a civil penalty under the Clean Air Act 
is based upon section 113 of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413, and contains specific factors which 
the court may take into consideration: 
[(1)] the size of the business, [(2)] the economic impact of the penalty on the 
business, [(3)] the violator’s full compliance history and good faith efforts to 
comply, [(4)] the duration of the violation as established by any credible 
evidence . . . , [(5)] payment by the violator of penalties previously assessed for 
the same violation, [(6)] the economic benefit of noncompliance, and [(7)] the 
seriousness of the violation. 
42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (2006). The court may assess a penalty “for each day of violation.” 
Id. § 7413(e)(2). Civil penalties will not be an effective deterrent if they are regarded as 
nothing more than the cost of doing business. See United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 
420 U.S. 223, 231 (1975); see also Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(“[There is a] close relation between the compensatory and deterrent objectives of tort law, 
or, more precisely perhaps, its rectificatory and regulatory purposes. Knowing that he will 
have to pay compensation for harm inflicted, the potential injurer will be deterred from 
inflicting that harm unless the benefits to him are greater. If we do not want him to balance 
costs and benefits in this fashion, we can add a dollop of punitive damages to make the costs 
greater.”). 
 136. JAY P. SHIMSHACK, EPA, MONITORING, ENFORCEMENT, & ENVIRONMENTAL 
COMPLIANCE: UNDERSTANDING SPECIFIC & GENERAL DETERRENCE 6 (Oct. 2007), available 
at http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/resources/reports/compliance/research/meec-whitepaper.pdf. 
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repeating its wrongdoing. The penalty should sting, but not be so severe as 
to destroy the corporation’s ability to continue to serve the public by 
producing electrical power. 
A. The EPA’s General and Specific Deterrence Objectives 
“Specific deterrence assesses a price to a particular wrongful act, 
whereas general deterrence fulfills the larger function of vindicating the 
broader societal interest by making wrongful acts more expensive and less 
attractive to potential wrongdoers.”137 When approving a CAA settlement, a 
court must consider general deterrence because its decision will send a 
message to an industry that has a history of externalizing its pollution costs 
by bypassing the CAA permitting process and risking the public’s health 
for profits.138 Both specific and general deterrence are predicated on the 
assumption that defendants engage in misconduct only after rationally 
weighing benefits and potential costs.139 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More: Federalism Derailed By the Court That Would 
be King of Punitive Damages, 64 MD. L. REV. 461, 523-24 (2005); see also Michael Rustad 
& Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the 
Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1318-28 (1993) (describing general deterrence as 
sending a cautionary message to other potential wrongdoers). 
 138. See Coal-Fired Power Plant Enforcement Initiative, supra note 10 (“On November 
3, 1999, the Department of Justice and the Environmental Protection Agency announced the 
filing of civil complaints against seven electric utility companies operating coal-fired power 
plants in the Midwest and Southeast, charging that their plants illegally released massive 
amounts of air pollutants over a period of several years and contributed [to] some of the 
most severe environmental problems facing the United States today. The companies 
involved are American Electric Power Company, Cinergy, FirstEnergy, Illinois Power, 
Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Company, Southern Company and Tampa Electric 
Company. In separate but related actions, EPA issued Notices of Violations to these same 
companies, plus an administrative order against the Tennessee Valley Authority. Perhaps the 
most comprehensive, coordinated enforcement effort under the Clean Air Act to date, the 
complaints, Notices of Violation and administrative order cover 32 plants located in 10 
states.”); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 30 (“The Justice 
Department, on behalf of the EPA, today filed seven lawsuits against electric utility 
companies in the Midwest and South, charging that 17 of the companies’ power plants 
illegally released massive amounts of air pollutants for years, which have contributed to 
some of the most severe environmental problems facing the United States today. The EPA 
today also issued an administrative order against the Tennessee Valley Authority, charging 
the federal agency with similar violations at seven plants.”). 
 139. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 376 (Ct. App. 1981). In 
Grimshaw, Ford’s decision to expose consumers to the risk of an exploding gas tank was 
based on a problematic “cost-benefit analysis” that balanced egregiously undervalued 
“human lives and limbs against corporate profits.” Id. at 384. Profit maximizers must know 
that the worst-case scenario (including punitive damages liability) is more serious than 
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The penalty against a coal-fired plant must be large enough so that other 
owners or operators of coal-fired plants are not tempted to cut corners on 
safety when constructing or modifying an electricity generating facility. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that “all civil penalties have some 
deterrent effect,”140 but “a threat [of a penalty] has no deterrent value unless 
it is credible that it will be carried out.”141 A large body of law and 
economics literature notes that efficient deterrence depends on sufficient 
punishment for failure to obey the law.142 Research on the relationship 
between environmental compliance and deterrence concludes that: 
First, environmental monitoring and enforcement activities 
generate substantial specific deterrence, reducing future 
violations at the targeted firm. Second, environmental 
monitoring and enforcement activities generate substantial 
general deterrence, reducing future violations at facilities other 
than the targeted one. Third, environmental monitoring and 
enforcement activities generate not only reductions in violations, 
but also significant reductions in emissions.143 
The EPA singled out coal-fired plants as a key enforcement priority 
because there was widespread noncompliance with the CAA’s new source 
permitting law.144 
                                                                                                                 
merely paying only what was owed in the first place (compensatory damages and a criminal 
sanction), plus legal expenses. Under California law, the maximum criminal penalty for 
violating federal automobile safety standards would have been $1,000 per vehicle (and up to 
a maximum of $800,000), an amount dwarfed by Ford’s net worth of $7.7 billion and its 
after-tax income of $983 million. Id. at 388-89. 
 140. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 
(2000) (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 102 (1997)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 141. Id. at 186. 
 142. See, e.g., 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 
3.11(3) (2d ed. 1993); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 2 at 9, 11-12 (5th ed. 1984); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of 
Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982). 
 143. WAYNE B. GRAY & JAY P. SHIMSHACK, INT’L NETWORK FOR ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & 
ENFORCEMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE ECONOMICS LITERATURE (n.d.), available at http://www. 
inece.org/conference/9/papers/GrayShimshack_US_FINAL.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
 144. National Enforcement Initiatives for Fiscal Years 2008 - 2010: Clean Air Act: New 
Source Review/Prevention of Significant Deterioration, supra note 38. The “EPA 
determined that many sources made changes to existing facilities without applying for and 
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B. Internalization Versus Gain Stripping Models of Deterrence 
 Economics-based deterrence theory suggests two broad approaches to 
punishment: internalization and gain elimination. Efficient deterrence 
requires that a court carefully consider both the benefit captured through an 
offense and the gravity of such offense. A gain stripping civil penalty only 
returns a utility “to the status quo ante, which does not adequately 
communicate the wrongness of the action; adding the reprehensibility-based 
fine makes the defendant worse off for his culpable conduct, as he should 
be from a retributive perspective.”145 Gain stripping removes the economic 
incentive for noncompliance by taking back the ill-gotten gains.146 The goal 
of the punishing authority is to shift all of the costs imposed on society by 
the offender’s misconduct back onto the offender—i.e., to force the 
offender to pay the full societal costs of harmful conduct.147 Thus, the CAA 
penalty must be high enough to reflect total societal harm.148 
                                                                                                                 
obtaining pre-construction permits. The lack of . . . permitting likely indicates that many 
stationary sources are illegally emitting thousands of tons of pollution into the environment 
by avoiding these Clean Air Act (CAA) requirements.” Id. Coal-fired plants were selected as 
one of four industrial sectors to investigate “based on the probability of past modifications 
that require NSR/PSD permits and the overall emissions.” Id. The other sectors selected 
were “cement manufacturing facilities, sulfuric and nitric acid manufacturing facilities, and 
glass manufacturing facilities.” Id. 
 145. Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate 
Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 297 (2008). “Economists conventionally seek to 
implement the goal of complete deterrence by setting penalties that strip any gain to the 
defendant from the misconduct, thereby removing any incentive to engage in the conduct.” 
Id. at 242. 
 146. Catherine M. Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages: Theory, Empirics, 
and Doctrine, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS (Jennifer H. Arlen ed., 
forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soL3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990 
336. (“The primary goal of gain elimination is the complete deterrence of socially 
unproductive activities; the primary goal of the property rights model is facilitation of 
voluntary market transfers.”); see also United States v. 2639 Meetinghouse Rd., 633 F. 
Supp. 979, 994 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (explaining how gain stripping works in the context of 
forfeiture). 
 147. See Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 
GEO L.J. 421, 421 (1998) (“Generally, complete deterrence is accomplished by eliminating 
the prospect of gain on the part of the offender.”). 
 148. See Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 
ALA. L. REV. 1143, 1148 (1988) (“In the absence of punitive damages, enforcement errors 
enable injurers to externalize a portion of expected social costs that they cause. Punitive 
damages should be set . . . at a level that eliminates the advantage of noncompliance and 
forces potential injurers to internalize the expected social costs of their actions.”). 
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Gain elimination is accomplished by ensuring that the penalty imposed 
on the offender is at least as great as the offender’s realized or expected 
benefit.149 Conceptually, this gain consists of at least (1) the direct savings 
from not implementing sufficient pollution control equipment or processes 
to achieve the MACT emission reduction levels required by a permit,150 (2) 
the interest on borrowed money that would accrue during the period of 
construction suspension associated with securing the MACT approval, and 
(3) the present-day value of thirty years’ cash flow delayed for the period of 
time it would have taken a plant to secure its MACT approval. The actual 
CAA penalty imposed on the offender should be at least as large as this 
minimum gain stripping level and also be calibrated to the seriousness of 
the potential harm to the health of the millions of Americans affected by 
emitting tons of HAPs into the environment.151 
Without a proactive calculation, profit-maximizing polluters would 
simply wait until they were caught violating the law before they complied. 
The cornerstone of the EPA’s civil penalty program is to recapture any 
economic benefit obtained from violating the law. The EPA then adds to 
this figure an amount reflecting the seriousness of the violation with respect 
to the radius and severity of the harm. The resulting figure is a baseline for 
determining the size of the penalty. 
C. The EPA’s Restorative Justice Mandate 
The EPA’s jurisprudence is not just about deterrence. Congress granted 
the EPA the authority to impose substantial civil penalties to enforce the 
Clean Air Act,152 specifically declaring that monetary penalties are 
                                                                                                                 
 149. See Hylton, supra note 147. 
 150. The EPA has proposed a set of categorical MACT emission levels for coal-fired 
plants. The EPA proposal determined that acid gases, such as HF and HCl, would be 
adequately controlled in new power plants, if SO2 were limited to 0.40 lb/MWh. 76 Fed. 
Reg. 24,976 (May 3, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63).  
 151. The United States Supreme Court has made it clear in its punitive damages 
jurisprudence that not just actual harm, but also “potential” harm, can be considered when 
determining whether an award is excessive. In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources 
Corp., the Court upheld a punitive damages award of ten million dollars where actual 
damages were slight because there was sufficient evidence demonstrating the potential 
damages arising from the energy company-defendant’s bad faith slander of title. 509 U.S. 
443, 462 (1993). Later, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Court recognized that 
the ratio of a punitive damages award could consider both actual and potential harm. 517 
U.S. 559, 582 (1996). In these cases, the Court made clear that the potential harm to other 
victims is a factor in setting punishment. 
 152. The EPA’s penalty policy applies to all of its statutory programs: 
In the late 1970’s, the United States Congress gave EPA the authority to 
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“necessary for deterrence, restitution and retribution.”153 The 1984 Policy 
on Civil Penalties “establishes three general goals: deterrence, fair and 
equitable treatment, and swift resolution of environmental problems.”154 
This empirical study demonstrates that the EPA utilizes restorative justice 
principles to supplement deterrence in achieving this three-part mandate. 
The EPA settlement mitigation projects and restorative injunctions share 
common ground with the core principles of restorative justice. Restorative 
justice is “woven throughout the fabric of the EPA’s mission”155 when it 
approves reparation or supplemental environmental projects that have a 
close nexus to the individual defendant’s offense.156 
                                                                                                                 
impose substantial civil penalties in what was then its four major statutory 
programs: Clean Water Act (also referred to as the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act), Clean Air Act, Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), and the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). The Agency realized that 
the water and air cases would be generating large civil penalties, and the EPA 
sought to make the assessment of civil penalties a rational process. On April 
11, 1978, the Agency issued a penalty policy addressing the major air and 
water violations. That policy directed litigation teams to calculate the violator’s 
economic benefit from violating the law as part of the penalty assessment 
process. 
Jonathan Libber, Making the Polluter Pay: EPA’s Experience in Recapturing a Violator’s 
Economic Benefit from Noncompliance, in FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 465, 465 (1989), available at http://www. 
inece.org/5thvol1/libber.pdf. 
 153. S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 373 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3756. 
 154. DANIEL RIESEL, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 4.04 
(1997). 
 155. J.P. Suarez, Integrating Environmental Justice at the Environmental Protection 
Agency, HUMAN RIGHTS, Fall 2003, at 8, 9 (published by the ABA Section of Individual 
Rights & Responsibilities), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_ 
rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol30_2003/fall2003/irr_hr_fall03_epa.html. 
 156. Brooke E. Robertson, Note, Expanding the Use of Supplemental Environmental 
Projects, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1025, 1025 (2009). 
One of the most limiting of these requirements is the nexus requirement, which 
states that there must be an adequate “relationship between the violation and 
the proposed project.” In some situations, there is simply no feasible project 
that meets this nexus requirement; therefore, an SEP cannot be included in the 
settlement. After the EPA accepts the proposed project, it determines the 
appropriate percentage to lower the penalty. 
Id. at 1026 (footnote omitted). 
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Restorative justice is a jurisprudential tradition that “emphasizes 
repairing the harm caused or revealed by unjust behavior.”157 This paradigm 
stresses reparations by the wrongdoer rather than retributive justice.158 Most 
proponents of this jurisprudential perspective focus on reintegrating violent 
criminals into the community by requiring them to right wrongs with the 
victim.159 We extend restorative justice principles to the EPA’s mitigation 
projects and injunctive relief when a utility agrees to undertake projects to 
improve the environment. In each of the twenty-two cases analyzed, the 
EPA and the settling defendant agreed to reparative projects that attempted 
to rectify environmental harm caused by preventable air pollutants. 
The EPA’s encouragement of Supplemental Environmental Projects 
(SEPs) in settlements is reparative, not retributive. SEPs are 
“environmentally beneficial project[s] that a defendant agrees to undertake 
in settlement of an enforcement action, but which the defendant is not 
otherwise legally required to perform.”160 The ABA Survey on SEPs 
confirms that the restorative justice dimension is designed “to improve or  
repair relationships among all stakeholders (i.e., impacted communities, 
facilities, and government, at all levels) following an environmental 
violation.”161 
D. SIGECO Settlement as a Case Study of Restorative Justice 
Since all twenty-two settlements involved the same general pattern of 
wrongdoing, it is sufficient to explore only a small sample of EPA coal-
fired plant resolutions in detail.162 The environmental costs of permitting 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Carolyn Raffensperger, Restorative Justice and the BP Catastrophe, SCI. & ENVTL. 
HEALTH NETWORK (June 21, 2010), http://www.sehn.org/blog/?p=394 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 158. See MARTIN WRIGHT, JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS: A RESTORATIVE 
RESPONSE TO CRIME 42 (Waterside Press, 2d ed. 1996) (1991). 
 159. DANIEL W. VAN NESS & KAREN HEETDERKS STRONG, RESTORING JUSTICE: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 14 (4th ed. 2010); see also Mary Ann Yeats, “Three 
Strikes” and Restorative Justice: Dealing with Young Repeat Burglars in Western Australia, 
8 CRIM. L.F. 369 (1997). 
 160. DAVID WOOLEY & ELIZABETH MORSS, CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK § 11:26 (2012). 
 161. NICHOLAS TARG ET AL., PUB. LAW RESEARCH INST., Preface to SUPPLEMENTAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS: A FIFTY STATE SURVEY WITH MODEL PRACTICES 3 (Steven 
Bonorris ed., 2007), available at http://www.uchastings.edu/site_files/plri/ABAHastings 
SEPreport.pdf. 
 162. The Clean Air Act permits private citizens and environmental groups to initiate 
enforcement actions. See David T. Buente, Citizen Suits and the Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1990: Closing the Enforcement Loop, 21 ENVTL. L. 2233, 2249 (1991). These “private 
attorneys general actions” are beyond the scope of this article. 
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violations at Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company’s (SIGECO) F.B. 
Culley Station coal-fired generating plant illustrate the aggravating 
circumstances that led the EPA to launch its enforcement initiative.163 Table 
9 depicts the annual death and disease toll from fine particle pollution for 
SIGECO’s F.B. Culley Generating Station, a 415-megawatt electricity-
generating power plant, located in Warrick County, Indiana, on the bank of 
the Ohio River.164 
 
Table 9: Death and Disease Attributable to Fine Particle Pollution 
Emitting From F.B. Culley Generating Station, a 415-Megawatt EGU165 
 
Type of Impact Annual Incidence Valuation
Deaths 10 $72,000,000 
Heart Attacks 15 $1,600,000
Asthma Attacks 160 $8000 
Hospital Admissions 7 $160,000
Chronic Bronchitis 6 $2,600,000 
Asthma ER Visits 10 $4000
 
The excessive and preventable air pollutants emitted by coal-fired energy 
plants pose real-world consequences for the health and welfare of 
surrounding communities, which justifies the EPA’s campaign to enforce 
permitting regulations. The EPA’s notice of violation charged the utility 
                                                                                                                 
 163. Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company (SIGECO) F.B. Culley Plant Clean 
Air Act Settlement, supra note 114 (explaining Clean Air Act violations at SIGECO’s F.B. 
Culley coal-fired power plant (Culley Station) that led to settlement). 
 164. F.B. Culley Generating Station, CTR. FOR MEDIA & DEMOCRACY, http://www. 
sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=F._B._Culley_Generating_Station  (last visited Mar. 24, 
2013). See generally Death and Disease from Power Plants, CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE, http:// 
www.catf.us/fossil/problems/power_plants/existing/map.php?state=Indiana (last visited Mar. 
24, 2013) (“In 2000 and again in 2004, Abt Associates issued a study commissioned by the 
Clean Air Task Force, quantifying the deaths and other health affects [sic] attributable to the 
fine particle pollution from power plants. In this newly updated study, CATF examines the 
progress towards cleaning up one of the nation’s leading sources of pollution. The report 
finds that over 13,000 deaths each year are attributable to fine particle pollution from U.S. 
power plants. This is almost half the impact that our 2004 study found and is reflective of the 
impact that state and federal actions have had in reducing power plant emissions by roughly 
half. However, much more still needs to be done.”). 
 165. Death and Disease from Power Plants, supra note 164. 
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with making modifications at its Culley Station such as replacing 
components, economizers, outlet sections of secondary super heaters, and a 
feed water heater, without obtaining a PSD permit.166 The EPA contended 
that none of SIGECO’s modifications fell within the “‘routine maintenance, 
repair and replacement’ exemption.”167 
The EPA notice charged SIGECO with violations that “resulted in the 
release of massive amounts of sulfur dioxide (‘SO2’), nitrogen oxides 
(‘NOx’) and particulate matter (‘PM’) into the environment.”168 SIGECO 
not only violated the EPA’s PSD requirements, but also Indiana’s State 
Implementation Plan (SIP) that prohibited “construction or operation of a 
major modification of a major stationary source in an attainment area 
without first obtaining a PSD permit.”169 The EPA and Department of 
Justice announced a settlement with SIGECO on June 6, 2002.170 This 
settlement, like all others in the sample, consisted of three principal parts: 
(1) the civil penalty, (2) required mitigation projects, and (3) the cost of 
complying with the EPA’s injunction.171 SIGECO agreed to pay a $600,000 
penalty and undertake mitigation projects with a nexus to the harm it 
caused.172 Finally, it agreed to expend thirty million dollars to install state-
of-the-art pollution controls and reduce emissions to comply with the 
injunction.173 This unique blending of deterrence and restorative penalties is 
                                                                                                                 
 166. U.S. EPA, Notice of Violation in the Matter of Southern Indiana Gas and Electric 
Company (n.d.), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/novs/civil/caa/nov-
coal-sigeco.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
 167. Id. at 3 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(2)(iii)). 
 168. Id. at 1. 
 169. Id. at 2. 
 170. Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company (SIGECO) F.B. Culley Plant Clean 
Air Act Settlement, supra note 114. 
 171. See id. Appendix A contains details of all the EPA settlements analyzed. 
 172. Id. (“Under the settlement SIGECO agreed to spend at least $2.5 million for an 
environmental project, the Sulfuric Acid Reduction Project, at the Culley Station. The 
Sulfuric Acid Reduction Project is designed to reduce the SO3 (sulfuric acid) content in flue 
gas at the plant’s largest unit.”). See generally Robertson, supra note 156, at 1044 
(explaining the nexus policy where the EPA requires projects have a connection to the 
harm). 
 173. Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company (SIGECO) F.B. Culley Plant Clean 
Air Act Settlement, supra note 114. The settlement requires SIGECO to spend “an estimated 
$30 million over a 4 to 6-year period to implement the following injunctive relief: [r]educe 
emissions of SO2 from about 9,800 tons per year to about 3,400 tons per year.” Id. Further: 
SIGECO will either retire or repower with natural gas and state-of-the-art 
pollution controls a third unit. In addition, SIGECO will surrender excess SO2 
emission allowances each year beginning in 2004. This surrender will prevent 
SIGECO and others from using these allowances to emit additional pollution 
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seen in mitigation projects agreed to by the utilities in the other twenty-one 
settlements as well.174 
E. The TVA Settlement’s Restorative Obligations 
The April 14, 2011, EPA settlement with the Tennessee Valley 
Authority175 also illustrates how the EPA penalty and remedial measures 
policies operate in tandem to achieve restorative justice as well as 
deterrence. The EPA first targeted the TVA in November 1999 for 
modifying its coal-fired plants “without first complying with Clean Air Act 
(CAA) preconstruction obligations that include[d] obtaining 
preconstruction permits and installing and operating state-of-the-art 
pollution control technology.”176 The TVA settlement resolved permitting 
violation charges at eleven of its fifty-nine coal-fired plants.177 The energy 
provider agreed to pay the U.S. Treasury ten million dollars as a civil 
penalty and spend an additional $350 million for life-saving environmental 
                                                                                                                 
into the environment.  
 [SIGECO will also] [a]chieve 4,200 tons of NOx reductions annually from 
SIGECO coal-fired plants by operating a new state-of-the art [sic] selective 
catalytic reduction control system all year long, on the largest unit at the plant. 
In addition, SIGECO will either shut down a second unit or repower that unit 
with natural gas and install a state-of-the-art selective catalytic reduction 
system. 
 [Finally, SIGECO will] [i]nstall a state-of-the-art Baghouse at the largest 
unit by 2007 to reduce emissions of PM by an estimated additional 200 tons, as 
well as optimize current PM controls at all three units to control PM emissions 
on all units in the interim. 
Id. 
 174. See Appendix A, containing descriptions of all the EPA settlements included in our 
analysis. 
 175. The TVA “is a corporation owned by the United States government, created and 
existing pursuant to the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. § 831-831ee.” 
Tennessee Valley Authority Clean Air Act Settlement, supra note 11. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. The TVA settlement included the following eleven coal-fired plants: 
Allen Fossil Plant near Memphis, Tenn.[;] Bull Run Fossil Plant near Oak 
Ridge, Tenn.[;] Colbert Fossil Plant in Tuscumbia, Ala.[;] Cumberland Fossil 
Plant in Cumberland City, Tenn.[;] Gallatin Fossil Plant in Gallatin, Tenn.[;] 
John Sevier Fossil Plant near Rogersville, Tenn.[;] Johnsonville Fossil Plant 
near Waverly, Tenn.[;] Kingston Fossil Plant near Kingston, Tenn.[;] Paradise 
Fossil Plant in Drakesboro, Ky.[;] Shawnee Fossil Plant near Paducah, Ky.[; 
and] Widows Creek Fossil Plant near Stevenson, Ala. 
Id. 
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mitigation projects.178 The TVA’s obligations included new air pollution 
controls, the repowering of renewable biomass, and a commitment to retire 
old coal-fired units.179 
The SIGECO and the TVA settlement defendants agreed to “heal and put 
things as right as possible” by financing pro-environmental projects.180 The 
parallel to restorative justice lies in the utilities’ symbolic demonstrations of 
good faith in embarking on specific projects for the common good. Just as 
restorative justice focuses on the healing of the breach, the wrongdoer, and 
the victim through remedial action,181 the EPA’s mitigation projects require 
                                                                                                                 
 178. Id. The TVA will pay: 
[An] estimated $3 to $5 billion on new and upgraded state-of-the-art pollution 
controls that will prevent approximately 1,200 to 3,000 premature deaths, 2,000 
heart attacks and 21,000 cases of asthma attacks each year, resulting in up to 
$27 billion in annual health benefits. TVA will also invest $350 million on 
clean energy projects that will reduce pollution, save energy and protect public 
health and the environment. 
Id. 
 179. Id. The TVA agreed to meet the following obligations: 
An obligation to address 92 percent of TVA’s coal-fired system between 2011 
and 2018 with either the installation of state-of-the-art pollution controls such 
as selective catalytic reduction (SCR) or flue gas desulfurization (FGD), 
retirement, or repowering to renewable biomass: [(1)] For NOx, 60 percent of 
TVA’s coal-fired system will be equipped with SCR, 16 percent will be retired, 
and 16 percent have the option to retire, retrofit with SCR, or repower to 
renewable biomass[; (2)] For SO2, 51 percent of TVA’s coal-fired system will 
be equipped with FGD, 16 percent will be retired, and 25 percent have the 
option to retire, retrofit with FGD, or repower to renewable biomass[; and (3)] 
Permanent retirement of 18 coal-fired units equating to about 16 percent of 
TVA's coal-fired electricity generating system—the largest retirement 
commitment any settling company has made to date under EPA’s Coal-Fired 
Power Plant Initiative. 
Id. 
 180. HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 37 (2002). 
 181. Restorative Justice, MEDIATION & RESTORATIVE JUSTICE CTR., http://mrjc.ca/ 
restorative-justice/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2013) (defining the principles of restorative justice 
as: “Hold the offender accountable to the victim and the community harmed or impacted by 
the crime[;] [r]equire the offender to take responsibility for ‘making things right’ as much as 
possible[;] [g]ive the victim a voice, and access to justice, by allowing the victim to 
participate in how the offender will be made accountable and redress the harm[; and] [i]nvite 
the community to join in supporting the victim, holding the offender accountable, and 
providing opportunities for the offender to rejoin the community[.]”); see also Hadar 
Dancig-Rosenberg & Dana Pugach, Pain, Love, and Voice: The Role of Domestic Victims in 
Sentencing, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 423, 442 (2012) (stating the purpose of restorative 
justice is to require the wrongdoer to remedy injuries and thus “promote repair, 
reconciliation, and security”). 
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the defendant to make a public demonstration of repairing the harm. 
Restorative justice aims to restore harmony based on a feeling that justice 
has been done. 
F. Reconceptualizing Restorative Justice for Environmental Wrongs 
The literature on restorative justice is overwhelmingly individualistic in 
orientation, dealing with questions such as the proper shaming and 
reintegration procedures for criminal offenders.182 The core value of any 
restorative justice program is an emphasis on “moral accountability of an 
offender toward the victim and the affected community.”183 Restorative 
justice theorists’ core principles, however, can be stretched to righting civil 
wrongs.184 The moral accountability of corporate polluters should include 
some service to the victim, which, in this reconceptualization, is not just an 
individual sufferer. Here, the victims are a statistical category in the 
community downwind from the toxic air or water. 
The primary direct casualties in these CAA coal-fired plant settlements 
are the victims of toxic air suffering cardiac arrest, cancer, or 
developmental problems. The specific victims of air toxins, however, 
cannot be identified with certainty and therefore are unlikely to prevail in 
traditional tort litigation against polluters.185 Epidemiological estimates can 
only determine the long-term probabilities of harm, not necessarily the 
identities of individual victims.186 Therefore, the best restorative justice 
proxy for specific victims is to draw upon environmental experts and local 
                                                                                                                 
 182. See William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, Corporate Crime and Making Amends, 44 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1307, 1309 (2007); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of 
Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-13 
(2007). 
 183. 42 U.S.C. § 3796ee(c) (2006). This emphasis on accountability to the victim is 
critical to the restorative justice programs for juveniles at the federal level. See id. 
In this section the term “restorative justice program” means a program that 
emphasizes the moral accountability of an offender toward the victim and the 
affected community and may include community reparations boards, restitution 
(in the form of monetary payment or service to the victim or, where no victim can 
be identified, service to the affected community), and mediation between 
victim and offender. 
Id. 
 184. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION (2002) 
(proposing the application of restorative justice solutions to white-collar crime, war crimes, 
and political crimes). 
 185. See Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 
52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732, 749-50 (1984). 
 186. See id. 
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leaders to represent the interests of the community. The public’s greater 
input will not only help design community supported projects to repair 
environmental harms, but also emphasize the need for polluters to undo 
wrongs by sending signals of healing, responsibility, and preventative 
vigilance.187 
Restorative justice requires the EPA to continue to inspect coal-fired 
plants—investigating the facts, filing enforcement actions, and negotiating 
the settlement of each case. However, restorative justice, in its purest form, 
calls for some direct input from the victims of these air toxins to determine 
projects that the utilities should undertake to rectify the harm inflicted. In 
the remedies stage, the EPA could encourage public participation in 
determining which projects would best remediate the defendant’s harm.188 
This process would give the defendant-corporation increased opportunities 
to understand the specific health problems that it has caused and to help 
“develop plans for taking appropriate responsibility.”189 
Civil mitigation through restorative projects and requiring the polluter to 
shoulder the costs of complying with injunctions are both policies that are 
consistent with the principles of restorative justice. Companies agreeing to 
make amends share common ground with reparative projects to integrate 
individual offenders into the community.190 When a utility agrees to install 
pollution control equipment to reduce by hundreds of tons the sulfur 
dioxide and nitrogen oxides being emitted, it is undertaking a reparative 
project. The participation of environmental groups would make it clear that 
coal-fired plants or other environmental offenders owe a primary obligation 
                                                                                                                 
 187. See Fundamental Concepts of Restorative Justice, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, http:// 
www.nij.gov/nij/topics/courts/restorative-justice/fundamental-concepts.htm (last visited Mar. 
24, 2013) (“A restorative justice process maximizes the input and participation or [sic] these 
parties—but especially primary victims as well as offenders—in the search for restoration, 
healing, responsibility and prevention.”). 
 188. In the first decade of the coal-fired plant enforcement initiative, the final settlements 
often involved greater sums expended for civil mitigation projects than for civil penalties. 
See supra Table 1 (comparing mean and median award amounts for civil penalties with civil 
mitigation projects). This is consistent with the National Institute of Justice’s principle that 
“restitution take[s] priority over other sanctions and obligations to the state such as fines.” 
Fundamental Concepts of Restorative Justice, supra note 187. Appendix A, the data 
underlying the findings of our study, reveals that the EPA implemented restitution principles 
in civil mitigation projects as well as the cost of complying with injunctions. 
 189. Fundamental Concepts of Restorative Justice, supra note 187. 
 190. “Restoration is not required unless the ends of justice require it.” Persson v. Smart 
Inventions, Inc. 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 335, 346 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Sime v. Malouf, 212 
P.2d 946, 963 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949) as amended on denial of reh’g, 213 P.2d 788 
(1950)). 
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both to the immediate victims and to the affected communities, where air 
and water have been degraded by emitting pollution or dumping wastes.191 
“Environmental justice, which seeks to protect minority and low-income 
communities from disproportionate amounts of environmental 
degradation,” clearly has a restorative justice dimension.192 
The EPA’s jurisprudence is not limited to coal-fired plant litigation. The 
EPA often requires defendants to engage in environmentally beneficial 
projects to settle environmental enforcement actions: 
[Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs)] are 
“environmentally beneficial projects which a defendant . . . 
agrees to undertake in settlement of an enforcement action, but 
which the defendant . . . is not otherwise legally required to 
perform.” In settlements of environmental enforcement actions, 
the EPA generally requires alleged violators to comply with 
federal environmental regulations and to pay a monetary penalty. 
The EPA will reduce the required payment in certain 
enforcement actions if the alleged violator agrees to perform a 
Supplemental Environmental Project as part of the settlement. 
The inclusion of SEPs in settlements furthers the “EPA’s goals 
to protect and enhance public health and the environment.” In its 
June 2003 memorandum, the EPA noted that SEPs are being 
underutilized and that there is tremendous potential to achieve 
even greater benefits for the environment with the increased use 
of SEPs in settlements.193 
                                                                                                                 
 191. Few scholars have recognized restorative environmental justice in EPA 
enforcement. The Public Law Institute identified a restorative justice dimension in 
Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs): 
 Affected communities stand to benefit from SEPs, as well, particularly as 
SEPs encourage restorative justice. The nexus requirement in most SEP 
policies results in local or regional environmental projects that help the area 
that suffered from the violation in the first place. A particular example of 
restorative justice is the policy goal of environmental justice. 
Steven Bonorris et al., Environmental Enforcement in the Fifty States: The Promise and 
Pitfalls of Supplemental Environmental Projects, 11 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 185, 204-05 (2005) (footnote omitted). 
 192. Id. at 211. 
 193. Robertson, supra note 156, at 1025 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted). 
“The seven specific categories [through which a project may qualify as an SEP] are as 
follows: public health, pollution prevention, pollution reduction, environmental restoration 
and protection, assessments and audits, environmental compliance promotion, and 
emergency planning and preparedness.” Id. at 1031-32 (footnotes omitted); see also 
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At present, the EPA has not adopted the restorative justice principle of 
seeking the participation of affected communities in determining 
supplemental environmental projects. The EPA could work with 
community groups on polluter and affected community reconciliation and 
restitution, which may result in victim impact statements.194 Restorative 
justice in civil enforcement might include restitution, community service, 
and reparative community-based projects to right probabilistic civil wrongs 
that affect diffuse victims. 
G. Restorative Justice as an Emergent Enforcement Paradigm 
The principles of restorative justice are prefigured in the enforcement 
practices of other federal agencies. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
requires violators to take affirmative steps to repair wrongs, as well as to 
prevent fraudulent, deceptive, and unfair business practices in the future.195 
Restorative justice has the potential to address the current global financial 
crisis by requiring lenders to take affirmative steps to help repair wrongs in 
affected communities.196 The FTC’s settlement with Countrywide (and its 
                                                                                                                 
Bonorris et al., supra note 191, at 188 (“Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) are 
environmentally beneficial projects that go beyond compliance and are undertaken as part of 
a settlement of an enforcement action[.] EPA may mitigate a portion of the civil penalty that 
otherwise might have been assessed. The project must improve, protect or reduce risks to 
public health or the environment. Further, the project must be implemented entirely after the 
EPA has identified a violation in order to be part of a ‘settlement of an enforcement action.’” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 194. Corporations are artificial persons, so remorse is not achievable. But the human 
agents of a corporation can be made more accountable through restorative justice. Stephanos 
Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal 
Procedure, 114 YALE L. J. 85 (2004) (building a case for remorse in criminal law reflecting 
restorative justice). 
 195. See, e.g., Prepaid Phone Card Marketers Agree to Pay $2.32 Million to Settle FTC 
Charges, FTC (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/02/millennium.shtm. The FTC’s 
settlement with prepaid phone card sellers required them to pay $2.32 million but also to 
change their practices. Id. In the future, consumers must receive clear disclosures of fees and 
charges. Id. “To ensure compliance, the settlement requires defendants to routinely monitor 
the advertising materials displayed by their distributors and the number of minutes of talk 
time their prepaid calling cards deliver to consumers.” Id. 
 196. Professor John Braithwaite advocates “using restorative approaches in addressing 
the causes of the global financial crisis and allied financial crises.” Michael King, Blogging 
the Non-Adversarial Justice Conference, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ONLINE (May 13, 2010), 
http://www.restorativejustice.org/RJOB/blogging-the-non-adversarial-justice-conference. 
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successor) reflects restorative justice principles in requiring reimbursements 
to homeowners harmed by unfair business practices.197 
The United States Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) is the 
primary enforcer for reducing injuries and death due to consumer 
products.198 In imposing the CPSC’s $1.25 million civil penalty against the 
importer of the lead-painted Thomas the Tank Engine children’s toy, the 
Commissioner observed, “[t]he tremendous costs associated with a 
voluntary or CPSC-ordered recall (over $42 million in this case) provide a 
significant financial deterrent.”199 A restorative justice approach to 
supplement this deterrence might call for the toy importers to develop 
educational programs to inform the public about the dangers of lead paint or 
even to remove this hazardous substance from public housing projects. 
Restorative justice principles were also embodied in the Master 
Settlement Agreement (MSA) with America’s cigarette manufacturers. 
“Under the Master Settlement Agreement, seven tobacco companies agreed 
to change the way tobacco products are marketed and pay the states an 
estimated $206 billion. The tobacco company defendants agreed to finance 
a $1.5 billion anti-smoking campaign, open previously secret industry 
documents, and disband industry trade groups . . . .”200 These educational 
projects were highly appropriate as remediation for the companies’ 
decades-long conspiracy to conceal the dangers of tobacco products.201 
The FTC’s case against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company contended that 
the use of the cartoon mascot, Joe Camel, caused children to take up 
                                                                                                                 
 197. See FTC Settlement with Countrywide, FTC (June 7, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/ 
bcp/cases/countrywide/index.shtml. 
 198. About CPSC, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, http://www.cpsc.gov/en/ 
About-CPSC (last visited Mar. 24, 2013) (“CPSC is committed to protecting consumers and 
families from products that pose a fire, electrical, chemical, or mechanical hazard. CPSC’s 
work to ensure the safety of consumer products—such as toys, cribs, power tools, cigarette 
lighters, and household chemicals—contributed to a decline in the rate of deaths and injuries 
associated with consumer products over the past 30 years.”). 
 199. Statement of Commissioner Anne M. Northup on the Proposed Civil Penalty 
Settlement of $1,250,000 for RC2 Corporation, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N 
(Dec. 29, 2009), http://www.cpsc.gov/pr/northup12292009.pdf (reporting unanimous vote to 
impose a civil penalty for the company’s importation of toys that violated the lead paint 
ban). 
 200. Master Settlement Agreement, STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE 
ATTORNEY GEN., http://oag.ca.gov/tobacco/msa (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
 201. See, e.g., Public Education Counter-Marketing Campaigns, STATE OF OKLA., http:// 
www.ok.gov/tset/Programs/Public_Education_Counter-Marketing_Campaigns/index.html (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2013) (describing states campaign against anti-smoking funded by tobacco 
settlement). 
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smoking.202 However, this case was dismissed because the MSA required 
the tobacco company to retire the camel mascot, spend “$1.45 billion in 
anti-smoking campaigns,” and “reduce[] children’s exposure to all kinds of 
tobacco advertising by removing cartoon figures from advertisements and 
public relations materials, banning cigarette-branded merchandise, reducing 
cigarette sponsorship of concerts and sporting events, and eliminating ads 
on billboards, buses, and taxis.”203 
Courts should consider community victim impact and relate this factor to 
corporate punishment, protection of the public health, general deterrence, 
rehabilitation, restitution, and restorative justice.204 Importing concepts of 
restorative justice from the criminal justice system can improve the ability 
of civil enforcers to meet the needs of community victims, encourage 
greater accountability, hold corporate offenders accountable, and provide 
rehabilitation and reintegration of corporate wrongdoers into the larger 
society through reparative projects with a nexus to the harm. 
Conclusion 
The distinctive feature of EPA enforcement is that it not only is 
deterrence-based, but also embodies core principles of restorative justice. 
The joining of these two distinct jurisprudential traditions, both specifically 
and generally, deters the polluter while simultaneously repairing past 
wrongs through remedial projects. Whether it is pollution, internet privacy 
violations, inadequate information security, dangerously substandard 
                                                                                                                 
 202. Joe Camel Advertising Campaign Violates Federal Law, FTC Says, FTC (May 28, 
1997), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/05/joecamel.shtm. 
 203. Josh Boyd, Organizational Rhetoric Doomed to Fail: R. J. Reynolds and the 
Principle of the Oxymoron, 68 WEST. J. COMM. 45, 46 (2004). 
 204. Restorative justice in the EPA’s coal-fired plant initiative involved polluters taking 
responsibility for their permitting violations and making amends to the communities whose 
air quality and public health were degraded. Our synthesis of deterrence-based economics 
with restorative justice is practical and achievable, as revealed by our data. As John Maynard 
Keynes reminds us, 
[T]he ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right 
and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. 
Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves 
to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of 
some defunct economist. 
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 
383 (Prometheus Books 1997) (1936). What is needed is for the EPA to establish forums 
where the owners of coal-fired plants may learn first-hand about the consequences of their 
actions. 
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products, or other practices that create diffuse harms, restorative justice 
seeks to make corporate persons accountable to society. The EPA’s 
enforcement initiative demonstrates that even billion-dollar utilities can be 
held accountable, notwithstanding that individual victims may be diffuse 
and downwind from the stationary source of pollutants. The EPA might 
consider extending the restorative justice dimension by involving the larger 
community and environmental action groups more directly in its settlement 
and remediation efforts. Local communities surrounding new or modified 
coal-fired plants have a clear nexus to the environmental and social effects 
from excessive downwind emissions arising from the utility’s failure to 
complete a New Source Review, and could be consulted in determining the 
most desirable restorative projects. 
Other regulatory agencies should consider whether restorative justice 
principles can be utilized more extensively to repair wrongs, particularly 
when the harms are probabilistic estimates rather than plainly identifiable 
sufferers. This emergent paradigm of blended enforcement principles seems 
well suited for agencies such as the Consumer Products Safety 
Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, all of which enforce regulations protecting the 
public. The Securities and Exchange Commission, for example, could 
incorporate a restorative justice dimension holding defendants accountable 
to the victims of Rule 10b-5 violations205 in cases where the victims are 
diffuse.206 Courts can also become more receptive to including reparative 
remedies for serious violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law. 
Future research should be directed toward exploring whether restorative 
justice strengthens communities and reduces re-offending for corporate 
wrongdoers, as its advocates claim. For too long, the restorative justice 
approach has been conceptualized as diametrically opposed to deterrence 
models. Creative solutions that blend the best features of the two 
perspectives can and should be adopted. 
                                                                                                                 
 205. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
 206. Most academics view restorative and retributive justice as an “either or” 
proposition, but there are a few scholars who, like us, view restorative and retributive justice 
as fulfilling distinct functions. Professor Joan Heminway, for example, “argues that the 
increased involvement of victims in Rule 10b-5 prosecutions, as an adjunct to existing 
processes and penalties, may better help to satisfy societal needs for justice and vengeance, 
achieve desired deterrence, and effectuate investor confidence and market integrity.” Joan 
MacLeod Heminway, Hell Hath No Fury Like An Investor Scorned: Retribution, 
Deterrence, Restoration, and the Criminalization of Securities Fraud Under Rule 10b-5, 2 J. 
BUS. & TECH. L. 3, 14 (2007). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss3/3
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 207. Tennessee Valley Authority Clean Air Act Settlement, supra note 11. 



























“TVA modified a 
number of coal-fired 
units at nine of TVA’s 
plants without first 
complying with Clean 
Air Act (CAA) 
preconstruction 
obligations that include 
obtaining 
preconstruction permits 




Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration/Nonattain-
ment New Source 
Review provisions, 42 






addition, cost of 
complying with 
injunctions was $3 
billion to $5 billion 
(used mid-point of 



















“NIPSCO modified a 
number of its coal-fired 
power units without first 
complying with Clean 
Air Act (CAA) pre-
construction obligations 
that include obtaining 
pre-construction permits 




Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration/Nonattain-
ment New Source 
Review provisions, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7470-7492, §§ 
7501-7515; and Title V 




NIPSCO to spend 
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 209. Hoosier Energy Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. Settlement, EPA (July 23, 2010), 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/hoosier.html. 









modifications at the 
Merom plant without 
first complying with the 
New Source Review 
program’s pre-
construction obligations, 
which include, obtaining 
pre-construction permits 
and establishing an 
emission limitation 
based upon Best 
Available Control 
Technology, in violation 
of: The Clean Air Act 
(CAA), Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration 
provisions, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
7470-7492,” Indiana’s 
State Implementation 
Plan and “Title V of the 
Clean Air Act and the 





Hoosier to spend 
$5 million on 
environmental 
mitigation projects 
to address the 
impacts of past 
emissions” 
(mitigation) and 
$275 million in 
pollution control 
technology that 
will protect public 
health and “resolve 
violations of the 
Clean Air Act” 
(estimated $250 




















made at the Gorsuch 




construction permits and 
installing and operating 
state-of-the-art pollution 
control technology, in 
violation of” the CAA, 
PSD/NSR Provisions 




also requires AMP 




to address the 
impacts of past 
emissions.” No 
cost of injunction 
listed on consent 
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 211. Westar Energy, Inc. Settlement, EPA (Jan 25, 2010), http://www.epa.gov/compli 
ance/resources/cases/civil/caa/westarenergy.html. 





“Westar Energy made 
modifications at the 
Jeffrey Energy Center 




construction permits and 
installing and operating 
state-of-the-art pollution 
control technology, in 
violation of The Clean 
Air Act (CAA) 
Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration provisions, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7492 
and the Kansas State 
Implementation Plan 
(SIP)[ and] Title V of the 
CAA and the Kansas 
Title V regulations.” 
$3 million 
$6 million in 
mitigation 
projects, plus $520 
million to comply 
with the injunction 
(estimated $490 

















“Duke made illegal 
modifications to 
Gallagher Units 1 and 3 
that caused significant 
increases in sulfur 
dioxide (SO2). The 
company made these 
modifications without 
first complying with pre-
construction obligations, 
including obtaining pre-
construction permits and 
installing and operating 
state-of-the-art pollution 
control technology, in 
violation of: The Clean 
Air Act (CAA) 
Nonattainment New 
Source Review and 
Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration provisions, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7492, 





$6.25 million for 
mitigation projects 
and $85 million for 
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 213. Kentucky Utilities Company Clean Air Act Settlement, EPA (Feb. 3, 2009), http:// 
www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/kucompany.html. 
 214. Salt River Project Agriculture Improvement and Power District Settlement, EPA, 









violated the Prevention 
of Significant 
Deterioration 
requirements of the 
[Clean Air] Act and the 
Kentucky State 
Implementation Plan 
(SIP) by modifying and 
subsequently operating 
Brown Unit 3 without 
obtaining a PSD permit 
and without retrofitting 
the unit with the Best 
Achievable Control 
Technology (BACT).” In 
addition, “[t]he Unites 
[sic] States alleges that 
Kentucky Utilities 
violated the NSPS by 
modifying Brown Unit 3 
and continuing to 
operate this unit without 
complying with NSPS 
emission standards and 
other requirements.” 
$1.4 million 
$5.6 million for 
civil mitigation 
(midpoint of range 
which includes 
$1.8 million to $7 
million + $1 
million + 
$200,000) and 

























“[V]iolated the Clean 
Air Act by undertaking 
construction activities 
that constituted ‘major 
modifications’ at 
Coronado Generating 
Station’s two coal-fired 
electric generating units, 
designated as Units 1 
and 2, without first 
undergoing PSD review, 
obtaining required 
permits, and installing 
Best Available Control 
Technology to reduce air 
pollution. The United 
States also alleges that 
SRP failed to include the 
PSD requirements in its 
Title V operating permit 
for the plant.” 
$950,000 
$4 million for 
mitigation projects 
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 215. American Electric Power Service Corporation Information Sheet, supra note 124. 
 216. East Kentucky Power Cooperative Settlement, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/compli 
ance/resources/cases/civil/caa/eastkentuckypower.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
 217. Nevada Power Company Clean Air Act Settlement, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ 









“AEP made physical and 
operational changes at 
nine of its plants that 
constituted ‘major 
modifications’ without 
first undergoing PSD 
review or Non-
attainment New Source 
Review (NNSR), 
obtaining required 
permits, and installing 
and operating Best 
Available Control 
Technology and/or 
technology reflecting the 
Lowest Achievable 
Emission Rate (LAER) 
to reduce air pollution.” 
$15 million 
AEP will “spend 
$60 million on 
projects to mitigate 
the adverse effects 
of its past excess 
emissions” and 





















“EKPC made physical 
and operational changes 




Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD) 
review, obtaining 
required permits, and 
installing and operating 
Best Available Control 




project is “valued 
at $47 million for 
installation of Wet 
Electro-Static 
Precipitators 




the cost of 
reducing pollutants 
to satisfy the 
















“EPA alleges Nevada 
Power violated the Clean 
Air Act by undertaking 
construction activities at 
two combustion turbines, 
designated as Units 5 
and 6, that increased 
pollution without first 
applying for an NSR 
Clean Air Act permit. 
An NSR permit would 
have required Nevada 
Power to take steps to 
reduce emissions at the 




and $60 million 
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 218. Alabama Power Company Clean Air Settlement, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/compli 
ance/resources/cases/civil/caa/alabamapower.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
 219. Minnkota Power Cooperative and Square Butte Electric Cooperative, EPA, http:// 
www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/minnkota.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
 220. Illinois Power Company and Dynegy Midwest Generation Settlement, EPA, http:// 








“Based on information 
received from the 
company, EPA alleges 
that at Plant Miller APC 
violated the CAA by 
commencing 
construction activities 
that increased pollution 
at some units without 
first applying for the 
required permit. A 
permit would have 
required APC to take 
steps to reduce emissions 
at the time of the 
construction activities.” 
$100,000 
$4.9 million in 
mitigation 
projects; “APC 
will [also] spend 
approximately 
$200 million 
between now and 




from Plant Miller 


















“EPA alleges Minnkota 
violated the Clean Air 
Act by undertaking 
construction activities 
that increased pollution 
at some units without 
first applying for an NSR 
Clean Air Act permit. 
An NSR permit would 
have required Minnkota 
to take steps to reduce 
emissions at the time of 
the activities.” 
$850,000 
$5 million for 
mitigation projects 
and $100 million 

















Company . . . violated 
the New Source Review 
provisions of the Clean 
Air Act at the Baldwin 
Power Station in 
Baldwin, Illinois.” 
$9 million 
$15 million in 
mitigation 
penalties and $500 
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 221. Ohio Edison Company, W.H. Sammis Power Station, Clean Air Act—2005 
Settlement and 2009 Modified Settlement, EPA (Aug. 11, 2009), http://www.epa.gov/compli 
ance/resources/cases/civil/caa/ohioedison.html. 
 222. South Carolina Public Service Authority (Santee Cooper), EPA, http://www.epa. 
gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/santeecooper.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
 223. Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company (SIGECO) F.B. Culley Plant Clean 











“Ohio Edison undertook 
construction projects at 
the Sammis Plant in 
violation of the New 
Source Review program. 
In August 2003, the U.S. 
District Court for the 
Southern District of 
Ohio affirmed all 
allegations and found 
that Ohio Edison failed 
to obtain Clean Air Act 




$25 million in 
mitigation projects 
and $1.1 billion to 



















“EPA alleges Santee 
Cooper violated the 
Clean Air Act” New 
Source Review program 
at several of its plants 
“by undertaking 
construction activities 





$4.5 million in 
mitigation projects 






















The settlement is “to 
resolve Clean Air Act 
violations at SIGECO’s 
F.B. Culley coal-fired 
power plant (Culley 
Station). . . . SIGECO 
violated the Clean Air 
Act by significantly 
modifying its Culley 
Station facility, and 
increasing its pollution 
output, without first 
applying for a Clean Air 
Act permit and taking 
steps to reduce increased 
emissions.” 
$600,000 
$2.5 million for 
mitigation projects 
and $30 million to 
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 224. Alcoa, Inc. Clean Air Act Settlement, supra note 71. 
 225. Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEPCO) Clean Air Act Civil Settlement, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/wepco.html (last visited Mar. 24, 
2013). 
 226. Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) Clean Air Act Settlement, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/caa/vepco.html (last visited Mar. 24, 
2013). 
 227. PSEG Fossil L.L.C. Settlement, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/ 




operated the Rockdale 
facility since it 
overhauled the Rockdale 
power plant without 
installing necessary 
pollution controls and 
without first obtaining 
proper permits required 
by the New Source 
Review program of the 
Clean Air Act. 
$1.5 million 
$2.5 million for 
mitigation projects 
and $330 million 
















violated the New Source 
Review provisions of the 
Clean Air Act at several 
of its plants by 
undertaking major 
modifications and 
increasing emissions of 
air pollution without also 
installing required air 
pollution controls.” 
$3.2 million 
$20 million for 
mitigation projects 
and $600 million 


















EPA charged VEPCO 
with having undertaken 
major modifications at 
their power plants 
without installing 
equipment required to 
control pollution that 
causes smog, acid rain 
and soot. 
$5.3 million 
$13.9 million for 
mitigation and 












Hudson and Mercer 
plants are unlawfully 
operating because they 
were modified without 
installing necessary 
pollution controls and 
obtaining proper permits 
required by the New 
Source Review program 
of the Clean Air Act. 
$6 million 
$3.25 million for 
mitigation projects 
and $337 million 

















                                                                                                                 
 228. Tampa Electric Company (TECO) Clean Air Act Settlement, EPA, http://www.epa. 








charged that Tampa 
Electric Company and 
six other utilities 
violated the law at their 
power plants by making 
major modifications to 
the plants without 
installing equipment 
required to control smog, 
acid rain and soot.” 
$3.5 million 
$10.5 million in 
mitigation projects 
(estimated $10 -
$11 million). No 
estimate for 
injunctive relief 
was given in fact 
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